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INTRODUCTION
My job market paper, "The Effects of Compliance Reminders on Personal Income Tax Payments in Greece; Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design", examines the effect of phone
call compliance reminders by the tax authority on payments of overdue personal income tax (PIT)
liabilities using administrative, individual-level information from 2013 tax records in Greece. The
aim of the reminders is to increase awareness about the payment deadlines and warn about the
potential tax levies in the case of non-compliance. I take advantage of the combined treatment
assignment rule, which leads to a discontinuous relationship between tax delinquents with liability
levels exceeding an arbitrary cutoff and the probability they receive a phone call reminder. I exploit
this discontinuity to identify the local average treatment effect of the compliance reminders on payments at the cutoff using a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design (RDD). The findings indicate that
information nudging may lead to two-way behavioral responses and even backfire under certain
conditions. Recipients of phone call compliance reminders pay less. The result is driven by the particularly negative responses of those with past years’ tax arrears. This behavior is compatible with
a notion of Bayesian updating of taxpayer beliefs about tax debt collection enforcement. Personal
income tax delinquents with prior experience with the tax authority eventually learn that the latter
may not act on its sanction threats, which renders information nudging non-credible anymore.
In my essay on corruption in public administration, "Housing Bubbles and Zoning Corruption; Evidence from Greece and Spain", with Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Eduardo Sanz-Arcega,
we investigate whether the housing bubbles in the Eurozone periphery affected zoning corruption.
We exploit variation in rent-seeking opportunities for zoning officials and profit opportunities for
housing developers from improved credit conditions and the large rise in housing prices in Greece
and Spain. Using aggregate information at the regional level and objective measures of zoning corruption, we estimate negative binomial models for each country separately that indicate a positive
and significant association between housing prices and zoning corruption. Specifically, a monthly
increase in housing prices (measured in euro per square meter) by 1% led to 3.79% more zoning
corruption counts in Greece, on average. For Spain, we find comparable effects around 9% for
1

increases of housing prices by 1% within a quarter, on average. We perform a series of robustness
checks that include zero-inflated models, linear models, and dynamic panel analysis.
In my essay about public health "The Short- and Long-term Effects of State Medicaid Expansions on Mortality: Evidence from a Synthetic Control Design", with Charles Courtemanche and
Daniela Zapata, we study the effect of state Medicaid expansions and one contraction on state-level
mortality and morbidity outcomes. This is an important health policy question because expanding
and contracting Medicaid is currently an active policy margin of the Affordable Care Act. We
contribute a novel study of the dynamics of the effects of state Medicaid expansions to adults
on all-cause adult mortality using a synthetic control design. Our analysis offers a comprehensive
evaluation of all state Medicaid expansions in the 1990s and 2000s regardless of scope of coverage.
Our results suggest that pre-existing estimates of mortality reductions due to Medicaid expansions
are overstated. Mortality reductions due to Medicaid are more pronounced in the long-run and only
where comprehensive insurance benefits are offered. However, no clear-cut relationship between
the size of the Medicaid expansions in terms of total number of Medicaid enrollees and adult mortality can be deduced. It is possible that adult mortality is not driven by the extensive margin of
health coverage but the intensive one; i.e., the quality and generosity of each state’s Medicaid plan.

2

Essay 1: The Effects of Compliance Reminders on Personal Income Tax Payments in
Greece; Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design
1

Introduction
Can behavioral strategies of information provision increase tax revenues in contexts of low vol-

untary compliance or is taxpayer behavior dictated by non-behavioral motives such as tax enforcement? In recent years, tax authorities throughout the world have enacted policies at an increasing
rate that indicate their perception that non-pecuniary factors are central in tax compliance.1 The
aim of these behavioral strategies is improving "tax morale"; i.e., increasing voluntary compliance
with the tax code to eventually establish a tax compliance norm (OECD, 2013). Mechanisms under
which tax morale, and thus tax compliance, may operate include information imperfections among
others (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).2
Information nudging is only one behavioral intervention available to the tax agency among
many others which can generally be classified as deterrent or non-deterrent. The former include
the use of audits, third-party information reporting, changes in the remittance regime, penalties,
shaming through public disclosure, and take-up of benefits. The latter comprise of neutral, information nudges or moral suasion nudges highlighting benefits from tax-funded projects, social
1 Some of the

earliest attempts to enhance tax compliance via nationwide campaigns took place in Spain, the Italian
tax authorities put forth Television and print advertising campaigns in Italy to enhance tax compliance during the
European debt crisis (Povoledo, 2011), and the Estonian Tax and Customs Board disseminated information in 2010
and 2011 to raise awareness among the population about the use of taxes by the state (Eurofound, 2013). Public
disclosure of tax delinquent lists online have been used by tax administrators in Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, El Salvador, Greece, Mexico, Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom and U.S.
states whereas names of tax evaders in Canada, Ireland, Italy and New Zealand have been listed in print.(Perez-Truglia
and Troiano, 2015)
2 Luttmer and Singhal (2014) define tax morale broadly as an "umbrella term capturing non-pecuniary motivations
from tax compliance as well as factors that fall outside the standard, expected utility framework" operating through
intrinsic motivation, reciprocity, peer and social effects, culture, information imperfections, and deviations from utility
maximization.

3

norms, social comparisons, or emphasizing tax fairness or equity. A large body of empirical
literature has emerged that examines behavioral strategies as a mechanism to enhance tax compliance using predominantly field experiments. The general takeaway is that both deterrent and
non-deterrent strategies can substantially increase tax compliance in contexts of high tax morale.
However, mainly deterrent strategies can effectively improve compliance in low tax morale environments. The existing evidence indicates that non-deterrent behavioral strategies generally have
null effects on voluntary compliance. Slemrod (2015) provides an excellent review of the recent
tax compliance and enforcement literature.
This paper evaluates the impact of a tax compliance information campaign on tax payments in
Greece. In 2013, the Tax Compliance Unit (TCU) of the General Directorate of Public Revenues
of the Ministry of Finance of Greece used e-mails and phone calls to remind personal income
tax (PIT) delinquent individuals of upcoming payment deadlines and increase awareness about tax
levies. All PIT delinquent individuals with a registered e-mail address received an e-mail reminder.
Then, a fraction of this population received a phone call reminder, giving rise to a natural experiment of increased salience in information provision. Using individual-level information from
de-identified tax records, I study the incremental effect of the phone call compliance reminder on
payments of PIT liabilities. To disentangle the causal effect of the phone call reminder, I employ
a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD). I take advantage of TCU’s treatment assignment
rule, which leads to a discontinuous relationship between individuals with PIT liability levels exceeding e500 and the probability they received a phone call reminder. This discontinuity generates
plausibly exogenous variation in treatment assignment which I exploit to identify the causal effect
of the phone call reminder on payments of PIT liabilities. Specifically, there is a jump in the conditional mean of the treatment variable at the e500 cutoff that provides identifying variation. This
4

allows me to estimate the effects of the reminder, within a neighborhood of the e500 cutoff, as if
they were randomly assigned. Using a fuzzy RDD estimator, I identify the local average treatment
effect (LATE) of the phone call reminder conditional on an e-mail reminder on payments of PIT
liabilities.
This study’s contribution is threefold. First, it provides a novel finding by showing that a behavioral tax compliance campaign may yield unintended consequences by decreasing tax revenues.
Second, it is the first study of the effect of national-level behavioral nudging on tax payments in
a OECD country with low tax morale context and weak tax debt collection enforcement. The
majority of the applied behavioral tax compliance literature has examined either contexts of high
voluntary tax compliance or cases of local taxes. Third, it extends our limited knowledge about the
effectiveness of different delivery devices; namely, e-mails as opposed to phone calls. The focus of
the pre-existing literature is almost exclusively on message content rather than delivery device. The
findings of this paper also have important policy implications. They directly inform the revenue
administration in Greece about the efficacy of non-pecuniary, behavioral strategies in increasing
tax payments. The findings here are generalizable to contexts of low voluntary compliance where
tax revenues are, also, more important for public finances.
Information nudging is expected to increase tax payments by minimizing informational asymmetries and taxpayer procrastination. I provide a simple theoretical model and empirical evidence
that show under which conditions information nudging can backfire. Taxpayer uncertainty about
the probability of debt collection enforcement may increase the present value of expected tax evasion and reduce expected tax payments. This is particularly true when taxpayers update their
beliefs about the probability of tax debt collection enforcement in the future downwards following
a period of weak enforcement. Therefore, the impact of compliance reminders emphasizing the
5

likelihood of tax levies on tax compliance is not ex-ante clear and warrants empirical investigation.
The estimated effects for tax delinquents with income tax liability levels around e500 indicate that
the compliance reminders may actually reduce tax payments. On the extensive margin, the phone
call reminders led to a 9.17%-9.14% decrease in the probability of any payment. On the intensive margin, the reminders caused a 21.4%-40.8% reduction in tax revenues, on average. When
I split the sample by debt vintage, I find that the overall behavioral response is indeed driven by
taxpayers’ experience of tax debt collection enforcement. Newly-delinquent personal income taxpayers do not change their payment behavior in any significant way. On the contrary, those with
tax arrears from previous years do react to the compliance reminders by paying substantially less.
This behavior is compatible with a notion of Bayesian updating of taxpayer beliefs about tax debt
collection enforcement. Personal income tax delinquents with prior experience with the tax authority eventually learn that the latter may not act on its sanction threats which renders information
nudging non-credible anymore.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature of behavioral tax
compliance with a focus on communication strategies from tax authorities. Section 3 presents a
theoretical model of Bayesian tax delinquents with uncertainty about tax debt collection enforcement. Section 4 describe the empirical discusses the data and methodology and Section 5 presents
the results. Section 6 provides robustness checks of the empirical analysis and Section 7 concludes.
2

Literature Review
The seminal theoretical work in tax compliance is due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who

adapted the Becker (1968) economic model of crime to explain why taxpayers evade. Given that
the actual level of tax compliance tends to be higher than what the expected utility model would
6

predict, more recently, the focus shifted to what motivates taxpayers to pay their taxes (Andreoni
et al., 1998). Often, tax declarations or tax deductions have been used as proxies of tax evasion
(Alm, 2012). However, Slemrod and Weber (2012) question those findings due to the often insurmountable measurement problems these studies suffer from. Hallsworth et al. (2014) argue that
focusing on tax payments rather than tax declarations would help mitigate such problems because
the causal path between treatment and outcome (compliance or delinquency) is direct. An intuitive, and relevant to this study, way of distinguishing these findings is by the nature (deterrent or
non-deterrent) and delivery device of the behavioral treatment.
2.1

Deterrence Behavioral Strategies
The first empirical study in behavioral tax compliance find that in Minnesota a higher perceived

audit probability can generate substantial taxpayer responses (Slemrod et al., 2001). Similarly, Iyer
et al. (2010) find that letters that increased taxpayers’ perception of non-compliance detection risk
and penalty awareness generated an improvement in tax compliance in the state of Washington.
However, the dissemination of information that would increase the perceived audit probability will
not necessarily improve tax compliance. Ariel (2012) reports null or negative deterrence effects of
moral persuasion messaging on tax payments and tax deductions on behalf of Israeli firms. Often,
the key to understanding what drives taxpayer behavior is the level of third-party information about
the taxpayer’s economic transactions that can be observed by the tax agency. Also, this appears to
hold true over a number of different types of taxes. In a field experiment conducted in Denmark,
Kleven et al. (2011) study the effects of tax enforcement to arrive at negligible tax evasion rates
for income liable to third-party reporting, but significant for self-reported income. In the context
of Chile, Pomeranz (2013) reports that an increase in the perceived audit probability of randomly
7

chosen Chilean firms increases compliance to the VAT. Castro and Scartascini (2015) find that
sanction-based messaging successfully generated more property tax revenues to the Argentine tax
authority. Ortega and Sanguinetti (2013) show that enforcement messaging has the largest effect
on compliance of a local business tax in Caracas, Venezuela. Del Carpio (2014) finds that a combination of a payment reminder and deterrence information enhances tax compliance of a local
property tax in Peru because it increases the perception of enforcement. In Norway, Bott et al.
(2014) show that an increase in the perceived audit probability can improve tax compliance on the
extensive margin. Their results show that deterrence messaging induced a great proportion of the
taxpayer population to file a foreign income tax return. Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2015) examine
the effects of a shaming strategy on payments of state tax delinquencies in the US. Their results
highlight that shaming can force more tax delinquents to settle their overdue liabilities but not in
cases of large-sized debts.
2.2

Non-Deterrence Behavioral Strategies
Non-deterrence behavioral strategies involve neutral, non-deterrent nudges that disclose gen-

eral information about payment deadlines and consequences of non-compliance. In addition, tax
authorities also use non-neutral messages that attempt to increase the moral cost of delinquency
through moral appeals to social norms, national identity, public goods, tax equity and fairness.
The communication campaign by the Greek tax authorities that this paper examines belongs in this
subset of tax compliance behavioral strategies.
The earliest findings from Minnesota suggest that normative appeals do not have an effect on
reported income in Minnesota (Blumenthal et al., 2001). Evidence from firms and individuals in
Australia by Wenzel (2005) and Wenzel and Taylor (2004) provide only weak support for the use
8

of norm messaging. Furthermore, Torgler (2004, 2012) finds anemic effects of mail-based moral
appeals on tax compliance in Switzerland. In the same fashion, Fellner et al. (2009) report that
moral suasion and social information letters do not improve compliance of individuals who evaded
TV and radio licensing fees in Austria. In fact, the authors show that appeals to morality or underlying social norms can backfire when letter recipients object to the moral values expressed or
when local non-compliance is widespread. Appeals to tax fairness and tax equity do not effectively
increase property tax revenues in Argentina according to Castro and Scartascini (2015). Experimental evidence from Venezuela by Ortega and Sanguinetti (2013) also suggests that moral suasion
is ineffective in bringing about taxpayer responses. Doerrenberg and Schmitz (2015) examine the
effect of informational provision on small accounting firms in a field experiment in Kranj, Slovenia
but do not arrive at any statistically significant results (potentially due to a low sample size). On
the contrary, Dwenger et al. (2014) report a positive degree of compliance with the local German
Protestant church tax when actual and perceived enforcement is nonexistent. This results shows
that, in the context of the German Protestant church tax, individuals comply with the law due to
intrinsic motivations. Hallsworth et al. (2014) conduct two natural field experiments in the UK
in 2011 and 2012 that challenged our knowledge surrounding the effectiveness of messaging onto
payment rates. The authors use norm, public goods and fairness messages in a standard tax payment reminder letter to effectively increase tax payments. Bott et al. (2014) implement a natural
field experiment on foreign income tax reporting behavior in Norway. They find that moral appeals can increase the amount reported by those who report any foreign income, generating more
tax revenues on the intensive margin. In the US, Guyton et al. (2016) use reminders to examine
the tax filing behavior of lower-income individuals.
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2.3

Communication Delivery Devices
In earlier work, the experimental variation was almost always introduced on the dimension of

message content rather than delivery device. Mail letters have served as the baseline communication device tax authorities employ. However, it is not clear whether the mode of communication
can determine a campaign’s success. In fact, the delivery device might play a crucial role in a
campaign’s success.3 Indeed, Ortega and Scartascini (2015) report sizable differences across the
effectiveness of a letter, an e-mail, and a personal visit by a tax inspector in a field experiment
of the National Tax Agency in Colombia. Similarly, Doerrenberg and Schmitz (2015) show that
in-home visits were more effective than letters to small accounting firms in Slovenia. These two
studies provide evidence that taxpayer responses are stronger as the salience of the delivery device
increases.
2.4

Empirical Designs
With the exception of Sanchez (2014), the recent wave of empirical evidence comes exclu-

sively from field experiments. However, the latter are not necessarily immune to bias (Imai, 2005).
More importantly, they are hard to replicate by the tax agency, let alone initiate by the average
unaccustomed bureaucracy. From the taxman’s perspective, policies which are straightforward to
implement, exhibit ease of scalability, and are highly accessible may be preferable to finely-tuned
field experiments that typically require a research unit. The only evidence in the recent tax compliance behavioral literature that is not obtained from a field experiment comes from Sanchez (2014)
who examines a natural experiment in Ecuador. He finds that simple notifications of outstanding
3 In

the context of get-out-the-vote calls, Imai (2005) shows that phone calls are associated with more substantial
behavioral responses than non-personalized methods such as flyers. In the same fashion, Stollwerk (2007) find e-mails
to be ineffective in voter mobilization in terms of registration and turnout.
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tax liability send by the national tax agency to firms with under-reported corporate income tax can
dramatically improve tax payments.
In sum, this paper’s main contributions to the literature comes from the examination of the
effectiveness of behavioral tax compliance strategies at the national level in a context of low tax
morale. In addition, this study extends our limited knowledge about the effectiveness of different
nudging technologies (i.e., e-mail vs phone-call). Finally, it deviates from the latest trend in behavioral tax compliance of using field experiments and, instead, relies on a natural experiment that
is easily reproducible by any tax agency.
3

Theoretical Framework
Tax debt collection enforcement is a key feature of the tax system. However, it is a relatively

under-studied topic within the theoretical tax compliance literature. Perez-Truglia and Troiano
(2015) present a model of taxpayer behavior that incorporates the degree of individuals’ income
garnishability. They examine the efficacy of pecuniary and non-pecuniary tax debt enforcement
strategies for the tax authority, namely financial and shaming penalties. Paramonova (2016) provides a dynamic model of tax debt with taxpayer heterogeneity in income and ability to escape
tax debt payment. She shows that alternative tax collection tools such as non-pecuniary tax sanctions in the form of a driver’s license suspension can serve as complementary means of tax debt
collection enforcement under certain conditions. Here, I consider how former tax debt collection
enforcement experiences affect current taxpayer behavior. This section provides the theoretical
foundation for the empirical investigation that follows.

11

First, I adapt the framework Snow and Warren (2007) offer by shifting the focus from taxpayer beliefs about the audit probability to tax debt collection enforcement. The result is a model
of Bayesian tax delinquents with uncertainty about tax debt collection enforcement. With regards to the taxpayer’s problem, the interest lies on how exposure to collection enforcement of
tax debt in the past affect current tax compliance. Second, I consider optimal tax policy for a
range of government preferences over tax revenues and private welfare following Perez-Truglia
and Troiano (2015). With respect to the government’s problem, I characterize the optimal mix of
deterrent (pecuniary) and non-deterrent (behavioral, non-pecuniary) strategies. The solutions to
the tax delinquent’s and the government’s problem are given in Appendix A.

3.1

A Model of Bayesian Income Tax Delinquents with Uncertainty about Tax Debt Collection Enforcement
Consider a two-period economy with a continuum of taxpayers indexed by subscript i, who

each has a tax delinquency of measure one.4 Tax delinquents prefer to defer paying in period
two given liquidity constraints. In other words, the cost of complying in period one exceeds the
level of the tax liability, Ri > 1. The severity of a tax delinquent’s liquidity constraint is uniformly
distributed between R and R. The variation in Ri reflects individual access to credit through formal
(retail banking) or informal (family, loanshark) lines. Ri is observable to the tax agency with a
degree of error through individual repayment history, employment status and other factors. The
tax agency also prefers revenues in the first period rather than in second one; i.e. it has a discount
rate Rg > 1. (Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2015).
Each period is characterized by a different state of the world regarding tax debt collection en4 What

follows in this subsection is an adaptation of Snow and Warren (2007)’s model of taxpayer behavior appended with a consideration of the government’s problem.
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forcement. Specifically, there are k ∈ {e, n} states of the world where k = e denotes perfect prior
enforcement whereas k = n denotes an imperfect one.5 The state of tax debt collection enforcement
is revealed by nature reflecting that is is not fully within the control of the tax authority. Imperfect
enforcement may arise either from administrative capacity issues or represent government preferences.6 Unpaid tax liabilities accumulate as a stock in the form of tax arrears.
The objective probability of perfect debt collection enforcement is denoted by p and is only
observable by the tax agency. Tax delinquents form subjective beliefs qi about the probability of
perfect tax debt collection enforcement. Their uncertainty is reflected by the cumulative distribution function F(qi ). The tax authority can influence subjective beliefs qi through its communication
strategy α such that effective subjective beliefs given by qαi . The parameter α ≤ 1 is an amplifier
of the taxpayer’s recollection of each tax debt collection enforcement experience. This variable is
determined by the tax authority through its communication strategy. The value of α is decreasing with the salience of the nudging device used (e.g. e-mail, phone-call, letter, in-home visit)
such that more salient devices are more influential (detrimental) in the formation of taxpayers’
subjective beliefs about debt collection enforcement. If no communication strategy (no nudging)
is employed by the tax agency then α = 1. Essentially, parameter α reflects how invested the
government is in shifting taxpayers’ beliefs about debt collection enforcement. Since taxpayers
maximize expected utility, the key parameter for their decision-making is πi , the mean of F(qi ),
which is equal to πi =
5 Imperfect

R1 α
0 qi dF(qi ). In both periods, the taxpayer’s decision of whether to skip

enforcement of tax debt collection is defined as zero or partial enforcement of collection of outstanding
delinquent debt by the tax agency.
6 Such preferences provide a reasonable explanation for the tax repayment plans that tax agencies around the world
are offering. A prominent example in the US is the IRS’ Fresh Start, a 72-month installment repayment plan. Such
repayment plans are policy relevant to cash-strapped governments as in the context I examine. As of 2016, the Greek
tax agency offers a repayment plan of 100 installments. This is a pilot program that commenced in 2014 after the
period of the subsequent empirical analysis. For my study population, tax liabilities that become delinquent in 2013,
a shorter 12-month installment plan was available to individuals.
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paying entirely [xi (R, πi ) = 1] the predetermined, reported tax liability that just became delinquent
or pay in full [xi (R, πi ) = 0] is based on her prior mean expectation of tax debt collection enforcement πi . However, if the tax agency warns about payment deadlines in a relatively salient way
in period one but fails to enforce them, then beliefs of imperfect debt collection enforcement in
period two become more prevalent.
Period One: Taxpayer Formation of Beliefs about Tax Debt Collection Enforcement
In period one, the taxpayer has no former experience as a tax delinquent in period one. A
reasonable, uninformative prior a newly-delinquent taxpayer might form is the expectation that
the outstanding debt of unity will be collected in full through tax liens, qi = 1. In a context
of weaker underlying enforcement or overall institutional quality, she might alternatively expect
imperfect debt collection, qi ∈ (0, 1), though. The taxpayer’s problem in period one narrows down
to choosing the optimal levels of payment xi1 and saving under uncertainty about the probability of
perfect debt collection enforcement to maximize period one expected utility given the level of the
financial penalty, θ > 1. From the additional income xi1 available due to imperfect debt collection
enforcement in period one, an amount si is saved for period two.

max EU(xi1 ; si ; πi ) = (1 − πi ) · [u(yi + xi1 − si ) + Ri ·V (si , πin )] + πi · [u(yi − θ xi1 − si ) + Ri ·V (si , πie )]

xi1 ,si ∈[0,1]

(1)

where yi is exogenously-determined, period one, post-tax income. The parameter θ > 1 is a
multiplier that accounts for the penalties incurred on first period’s outstanding tax delinquencies.
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The taxpayer’s beliefs about perfect debt collection in the second period have only an indirect
income effect (operationalized through the choice of savings) on the likelihood of not paying the
outstanding tax liability in the first period and risk penalties in the case of enforcement. This is
true when the taxpayer exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) which is an empirically
relevant assumption. Thus, first-period net income increases as the current tax debt collection
enforcement experience becomes more informative about the probability of perfect tax debt collection enforcement in the second period. However, there is no effect on tax evasion when the
taxpayer exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) because the income change has no effect on the decision to not pay. The discrepancy arises due to the relatively more risk-loving nature
of the DARA taxpayers. Under DARA, saving decreases due to the positive effect of increased π e
on second-period expected utility.
Period Two: Tax Collection under Informational Asymmetries
After the experience of the debt collection enforcement in the first period, the tax delinquent’s
posterior belief is updated following Bayes’ rule to the conditional probability distribution F(qi |k).
The expected conditional probability of perfect debt collection enforcement in the second period is
equal to πik =

R1 α
0 qi dF(qi |k). Following Snow and Warren (2007), it is assumed that the posterior

probability decreases relative to the prior if enforcement is imperfect (πin < πi ) and vice-versa
(πie > πi ). Internally consistent taxpayer beliefs require the ex-ante expected value of posterior
beliefs about the probability of perfect debt collection enforcement to be equal to the prior’s value;
i.e., (1 − πi )πin + πi πie = πi . The income available in period two from evading in period one is also
taxable. The taxpayer’s indirect expected utility maximization problem in period two is choosing
the fraction xi2 of the second period tax arrears to skip paying. Now, the taxpayer decides how
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much of her tax arrears to pay based on her posterior subjective belief of being enforced to service
her outstanding debt.

max

xi2 ∈[0,1],πik ∈[0,1]

V (xi2 ; πik ) = (1 − πik )u[(1 + r)si + xi2 ] + πik u[(1 + r)si − θ · xi2 ]

(2)

where si is the level of savings from period one available in period two at the prevailing interest
rate r.
Assuming Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA), it is not clear whether tax evasion will
increase or decrease in the second-period. Second period tax evasion may in principle be lower
but is assumed to be dominated by the first-period increase such that tax evasion increases with
Bayesian updating over time. Due to lower savings in period one, the taxpayer is less inclined
to bear risk in period two. However under Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA), expected
second-period income tax evasion increases as the taxpayer updates her beliefs about perfect debt
collection enforcement based on previous experience. For the case of constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) equal to one, tax evasion is higher in period one, lower in period period two, and higher
overall due to Bayesian updating (assuming rate of return equal to social discount factor).
3.2

Optimal Tax Policy
The benefit to the government when the tax delinquency is resolved in period 1 relative to

period 2 is reflected by Rg > 1. Note that the government treats all tax revenues in period one
equally, regardless of the liquidity constraints the tax delinquents face. Let xi∗ denote the bestresponse function of tax delinquent i. Similar to Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2015), the govern-
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ment maximizes social welfare which is a weighted average of the tax agency’s tax revenues and
tax delinquents’ private welfare. It has two choice variables to its disposal: the level of the financial
penalty θ and the intensity of the tax debt collection enforcement experience, α ≤ 1, through the
choice of its communication strategy with tax delinquents. Essentially, the government is considering the socially optimal mix of incentives to avoid crowding-out prosocial behavior (Benabou
and Tirole, 2006).

max SW (θ , α) = ψ · T (θ , α) + (1 − ψ) · PW (θ , α)

θ >1,α≤1

(3)

The parameter ψ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the government’s preference in the second period for an extra
dollar in its coffers relative to the taxpayers’ pockets. It could be interpreted as the rate of return
from government spending. For a non-benevolent government that enjoys a higher marginal return
from government expenditures than private welfare ψ ∈ ( 12 , 1). This might be preferable because
tax revenues can be used to provide the efficient level of public goods (Samuelson, 1954). For a
benevolent government that faces a higher marginal return from taxpayers’ private welfare than
its own tax revenues ψ ∈ (0, 12 ). For example, an inefficient government may simply prefer its
constituents to pocket the tax revenues its tax collection system would have otherwise failed to
capture. When the government is indifferent between tax revenues and private welfare, the firstbest can be attained by eliminating all informational asymmetries about the probability of perfect
debt collection enforcement. That is, the government should not allow the tax delinquents to form
beliefs about debt collection enforcement but engage in a communication campaign if debt collection is perfectly enforced. Clearly, this is also true when the government places higher value on
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private welfare than tax revenues allowing tax delinquents to optimize their re-payment behavior.
However, when the government puts more weight on tax revenues than private welfare and debt
collection is imperfectly enforced, it is optimal to not correct all informational asymmetries in first
period and surprise tax evaders in the second period by collecting both principal and interest on
the tax liability.7
Bayesian updating implies an expected net loss of tax revenues, inclusive of penalties. The
theoretical predictions about the incidence of these losses in tax revenues depend on the risk preferences of the taxpayer. Following CARA, tax evasion is unaffected in period one, saving is lower
which leads to a narrower tax base for period two, and expected tax evasion in period two increases. Following CRRA of unity, both saving is decreased and expected evasion is increased
such that expected tax revenues are lower. For the empirically-relevant case of risk preferences,
DARA, there will be an increase in expected tax evasion in period one when allowing taxpayers to
form beliefs about tax debt collection enforcement. In period two, expected tax evasion could decrease if tax debt collection in period one was strongly enforced but the net effect on tax revenues
may still be negative due to a narrower tax base following decreased first-period savings. If tax
debt was weakly enforced in period one, then the reduction in tax revenues due to a narrower tax
base is compounded by increased non-compliance. Taxpayer Bayesian updating provides another
window of opportunity for tax evasion. The policy implication with regards to tax revenues is that
reduced uncertainty about the probability of perfect debt collection enforcement may enhance tax
compliance. Thus, the compliance reminders can play a prominent role in enhancing tax compliance as devices that allow the tax authority to appropriately re-anchor taxpayer beliefs about tax
debt collection enforcement.
7 Since

some taxes are paid by non-citizens this could plausibly be the case.
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4

Empirical Analysis
This section discusses this study’s empirical approach.

4.1

Institutional Background: Taxation in Greece
Greece is a country with a large shadow economy. Schneider et al. (2010) find that among the

OECD countries Greece features the second largest shadow economy, representing 28.9% of GDP
during the years leading up to the recent financial crisis. Tax withholding in Greece is handled as
in a conventional Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) program where employers must withhold income tax
from their employees’ compensation. However, large-scale employee underreporting on behalf of
the employer (to evade social contributions) implies that even the PAYE system captures only a
fraction of income tax base. Indeed, Matsaganis and Flevotomou (2010) estimate income underreporting at 10%, precipitating a 26.1% shortfall in tax yield. Artavanis (2016) exploits VAT tax
rate changes in 2011 and 2013 to document the disclosure of "hidden" sales as restaurant firms
adjusted their reported VAT sales ratio (reported sales over reported inputs). Using confidential,
micro-level bank credit information, Artavanis et al. (2015) estimate a lower bound of e28 billion
of unreported income from self-employed people alone for Greece in 2009. Litina and Palivos
(2016) provide empirical evidence and a theoretical framework that highlight the key role of political corruption in the exacerbation of tax evasion in Greece in recent years.
Revenue administration in Greece is facing a bleak outlook with regards to tax revenues. As of
2013, tax liabilities and arrears by individuals to the Greek government totaled US$64.67 billion.
To put this in perspective, the general government debt owed by Greece to its international creditors was US$342.31 billion (174.9% of GDP). Undoubtedly, the severe economic crisis (on-going

19

recession from 2009) has largely contributed to the rise in tax delinquencies. But, weak tax debt
collection enforcement has been another important reason for such sluggish tax collections. For
example, the general government in 2012 alone accrued $3.48 billion of new tax debt (25% of total
assessed taxes) of which only $1.57 billion was collected. By international standards, the available instruments for tax debt collection enforcement are deemed inadequate IMF (2013). Figure
1 shows that in 2011 tax debt that went uncollected almost matched net tax revenue collections
(89.5% relative to a 12.4% and 11.4% EU and OECD average, respectively). To make things
worse, policy makers have not been able to collect from the "hard to tax" and, largely, rely on
"easier" tax handles instead (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2003). For a elaborate illustration of all
the available pathways to tax evasion in Greece refer to Figure C.1 in Appendix C.

Figure 1: Comparison of Outstanding Undisputed Tax Debt among EU Member States

It is important to note that the tax burden borne by individuals and firms in Greece increased
significantly and frequently, in recent years. Just in 2013, two legislative acts amended provisions of the country’s income and VAT tax code that raised new rates, and lowered tax eligibility
thresholds and tax reliefs.8
8 In

January 2013, the Tax Law No.4110 (No. 4110 / Government Gazette FEK No. 17 A’/23.01.2013 "Income Tax
Provisions, Issues related to the authorities of the Ministry of Finance and Other Regulations") amended provisions of
the Income Tax Code. Only six months later, The New Law No. 4111 (No. 4111 / Government Gazette FEK No. 18
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Figure 2: Eurobarometer: Trust in Government; Nov 2011 - May 2015
4.2

Description of the Natural Experiment
In an effort to increase much-needed tax revenues in 2013, the Tax Compliance Unit (TCU)

of the Department of Public Revenues of the Ministry of Finance of Greece used phone-calls and
e-mails to remind personal income tax delinquent individuals of upcoming payment deadlines and
warn about potential tax liens. In particular, the reminder warned that measures will be taken in
the case of non-compliance but did not explicitly mention financial (as interest accrual) or nonfinancial penalties (in the form of barriers to entering the labor market) for individuals. The nature
of the intervention could be understood as a neutral nudge of information provision and, thus,
operate within the fifth class of suggested tax morale mechanisms above.
The e-mail campaign was massive as e-mails were sent to virtually any tax delinquent, individual or firm, with an e-mail address registered to the tax agency. However, the TCU never
perceived the e-mail campaign to be a particularly effective communication strategy. Given the
A’/25.01.2013 "New Law relating to various legislative provisions of urgent nature") was published in the Government
Gazette replacing the Income Tax Code.
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increasing complexity of the tax code in Greece that occurred during the crisis years, many individuals resorted to accountants for support in filing their taxes. In recognition of this phenomenon,
the TCU was concerned that a large proportion of the e-mail reminders were sent to the tax delinquent’s accountant e-mail address rather than himself. To increase the salience of the informational
nudge, the TCU decided to enact a phone call campaign. An internal call center reached delinquent
individuals to restate the information contained in the e-mail over the phone. Given the limited resources that the TCU could devote to a call center, the reach of the phone call campaign was much
smaller relative to the one of the costless e-mails. To maximize expected payments, the tax delinquents who received a phone call reminder were selected following a tax repayment risk-analysis
that highlighted those most likely to pay.
4.3

Data
Data Description
The confidential, individual-level tax information this paper uses was made available by the

TCU in de-identified form. The dataset includes the 2013 cross-section of personal income tax
delinquents in Greece as well as tax arrears from earlier years. Information includes the taxpayer’s
unique ID, e-mail or phone call treatment indicators, liability levels and end-of-year payments
thereof. Tax arrears represent levels of outstanding debt from tax delinquencies of years prior to
2013. Demographic information includes the legal entity of the tax delinquent (whether it is an
individual or a firm). For individuals, there is information regarding their sex, date of birth, possible
date of death, zip code, whether the individual is currently employed, and occupation. Summary
statistics by treatment status and tax debt vintage are given in Tables D1 and D2 in Appendix D.
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To accommodate liquidity constraints, the tax agency collects income taxes in quarterly installments. This makes possible for the same individual to appear as a new tax delinquent multiple
times in the dataset over the course of 2013 (e.g., a personal income tax delinquent not paying her
monthly installment in quarter one, servicing both current and outstanding liabilities in the second
quarter, failing to do so in the third). A time delinquency identifier allows me to create a panel
of individual observations over installment periods. This permits testing whether the effect of the
reminder is transitory or permanent, within the limited span of a calendar year.
Experimental Variation
The base treatment arm of the analysis is the combined compliance reminder; i.e., taxpayer
overdue notice via phone call conditional on earlier e-mail notice. The control group is comprised
of taxpayers who only received an e-mail notice.9 In other words, I examine the incremental effect
of a phone reminder relative to an e-mail one. Image E1 in Appendix E provides a translation of the
message that was communicated. Clearly, the treatment should be understood as a neutral, nondeterrent behavioral nudge that corrects informational asymmetries about the payment deadline
and sets high expectations about tax debt collection enforcement in a more salient manner (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2012).
9 The

choice of the e-mail reminder recipients as opposed to a pure control group of tax delinquents who did not
receive any notice at all is driven by three reasons. First, doing so the analysis is in line with the recent practice in
behavioral tax compliance field experiments. For example, Hallsworth et al. (2014) uses taxpayers who received a
letter compliance reminder as their control group, introducing variation through additional behavioral nudges. Second, e-mail compliance reminders appear to be the default option from the Greek tax authority’s perspective.10 Tax
administrators are typically bound by law to provide notice to tax delinquents before applying penalties and levies.
Thus, a setting where the control group does receive some type of notice is, generally, more policy relevant. Third, the
fact that the tax authority failed to provide any notice to some individuals indicates limited third-party information on
them or taxpayer negligence to register with the integrated tax system. To avoid using information from a potentially
outlier population, I use e-mail compliance reminder recipients as the control group.
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Exploratory Data Analysis of Phone Call Campaign
First, I present evidence of the separation in covariate balance between the income tax delinquents who received a phone call and those who only received an e-mail. Figure 3 illustrates
histograms of the propensity score for the treated (phone call and e-mail reminder recipients) and
untreated population (e-mail reminder recipients). The mass of untreated individuals have a very
low probability of receiving a phone call. This highlights the extensive selection on these observables in the design of the phone call campaign. It also questions the validity of the matching design
since the untreated population provides individuals who are only comparable with a sliver of the
treated population; i.e., only those with a very low probability of receiving a phone call reminder.

Figure 3: Histograms of Propensity Scores for Phone Call and non-Phone Call Reminder Recipients

Reported income tax delinquencies were naturally bounded from below at e50 by the TCU.
Figure 4 below presents a histogram of personal income tax liabilities. For purposes of exposition,
the figure is scaled to liability levels up to e2,000 to highlight the discontinuity in the treatment
assignment decision rule at e500. Each bin represents a e10 range within the support. Evidently,
there is very strong adherence to the treatment assignment rule. Only 0.004% with total income tax
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liabilities under e500 received a reminder phone call. This figure provides preliminary graphical
evidence that the TCU called income tax delinquents on the basis of whether their liability exceed
e500 or not. The illustrations of the raw data clearly indicate that the RDD is far superior to the
matching design. This is part of the reason why the RDD results serve as the baseline of the paper.

Figure 4: Histograms of Forcing Variable (Total Personal Income Tax Liabilities) for Phone Call
and non-Phone Call Reminder Recipients

4.4

Identification
I begin with a simple but likely naive approach that compares all phone call reminder recipients

to all non-recipients conditional and unconditional on observable characteristics. To disentangle
the causal effect of the reminders I employ two quasi-experimental methods; matching methods
and a regression discontinuity design (RDD). The TCU arbitrarily contacted only those with tax
liabilities greater or equal to e500; but not in their entirety, which gives rise to a natural experiment.
First, in the presence of crossovers, I use matching to recover the global effect over the entire
distribution of tax liabilities. Then, I exploit the discontinuity in the policy rule that determines
treatment assignment at the cut-off. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I identify the
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local average treatment effect (LATE) of the compliance reminders on payments of overdue tax
liabilities. Section B in the Appendix provides more details on the each one of the identification
strategies employed.
For each tax delinquent i, the observed outcome is Yi = TiYi (1) + (1 − Ti )Yi (0). However, only
one of these potential outcomes can be observed as each respondent will receive either treatment or
control, not both; "the fundamental problem of causal inference" (Holland, 1986). Using potential
outcomes notation, the treatment effect for respondent i, T Ei = Yi (1) −Yi (0), is unobserved.
Regression Adjustment
As a first, naive estimate of the phone call reminders’ treatment effect, I calculate the raw (unadjusted and adjusted) difference in the level of payments between treatment and control group
means. As mentioned in 4.2, the recipients of the phone call reminder were selected by the tax
authority as the more likely to pay. Specifically, they were selected on the basis of observable
characteristics most associated with tax compliance such as age, gender, employment status, and
the level and vintage of the outstanding liability. The non-random assignment of the reminder
introduces upwards bias to the estimated treatment effect. As a result, OLS estimates of the parameter of interest will be potentially overestimated. Despite its shortcomings, this calculation is
still interesting from a policy perspective because it shows the implications of the phone call campaign on tax revenues. To assert its effectiveness, the tax authority would first like to know the net,
aggregate effect of the phone call campaign on total tax payments. By partitioning the distribution
of tax liabilities in increments, the tax authority can also examine heterogeneity in taxpayer responses by the size of their tax liability. This could help the design of future phone call campaigns
by optimizing the targeting of tax delinquents by the size of their tax liability.

26

Coarsened Exact Matching
The fuzzy RD method has excellent internal validity but its identifying region is only local,
around the cutoff. To recover the global effect of the reminders over the entire distribution of liabilities (not just within a neighborhood of the e500 cutoff), I rely on matching methods. The TCU
reminded individuals with liabilities greater than e500 but not in their entirety. The existence of
cross-overs in the study population - individuals with liabilities greater than e500 that were not
treated - provides a very large number of untreated observations. This allows me to construct
control groups that are comparable to the treated ones using matching. Matching is not an estimation technique but a pre-processing procedure. I use matching to mimic the TCU’s assignment
of treatment through the ex-post construction of a control group. The generated weights offer a
post-matching sample that is less "model-dependent", has lower bias and more efficiency.
For identification, I am assuming selection on observables. That is, selection of tax delinquents
into the treatment population was solely based on the observable demographic and socio-economic
characteristics available used for pre-processing. This is a plausible assumption because the TCU’s
selection of phone call recipients was guided by a tax repayment risk analysis informed by the
same observable information available to me. This allows me to give a causal interpretation of the
estimated treatment effects for the entire distribution of liabilities as well, not just around the e500
cutoff.
I choose coarsened exact matching (CEM) as the baseline matching method of the analysis
because it provides post-matching samples that are better balanced and estimates of the causal
quantity of interest that have lower root mean square error than alternative matching techniques
(Iacus et al., 2011). CEM assigns weights wi to matched and unmatched observations that eliminate all differences (covariate imbalancess) across treatment and control groups up to the level of
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coarsening. It is important to note that CEM prunes both treated and control respondents. The
computed weights wi lead to a post-matching subsample that exhibits superior covariate balance
(Tables D3 through D5 in Appendix D). This process changes the quantity of interest under study
to the treatment effect in the post matching subsample.
Regression Discontinuity Design
To isolate causal effects, the RDD differentiates the non-linear and non-continuous indicator
function I(Xi ≥ X0 ) with x0 = 500 from the smooth function g(Xi ) that determines treatment. I
exploit the discontinuity at Xi = X0 in the probability of treatment Ti conditional on liability level
Xi to instrument treatment assignment Di :

P[Di = 1|Xi ] =





g1 (Xi ), if xi ≥ x0 .

(4)




g0 (Xi ), if xi < x0 .

where g0 (Xi ) 6= g1 (Xi ). The relationship between the probability of treatment Ti and level of
total liability Xi can be expressed as:

P[Di = 1|Xi ] = g0 (Xi ) + [g1 (Xi ) − g0 (Xi )] · Ti

(5)

For identification I use the same assumptions as the binary instrumental variables design. Inference comes solely from the complier population. These are the observations for which treatment
status changes as I change the value of xi from just to the left of x0 to just to the right of x0 .
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4.5

Estimation
Regression Adjustment
I regress payments of total liabilities on a constant, the treatment indicator and controls using

the full sample. The latter include age and its quadratic, an indicator for male gender, the level
of the outstanding tax liability and its quadratic, an indicator of whether the tax delinquent has
outstanding tax arrears("former debtor"), indicators of salaried, self-employed and unemployed
status, and the number of delinquent installments in 2013. I also include quadratics of age and
level of tax liability and interactions of treatment with the former debtor indicator and age with
the male indicator. I estimate using OLS and clustering standard errors at the tax delinquent’s zip
code.
Coarsened Exact Matching
Applying the CEM weights, I regress payments of total liabilities on a constant and the treatment variable. If the covariate balance of the post-matching sample is sufficiently high then the
coefficient of the treatment variable shows the causal effect of the compliance reminder on payments of overdue tax liabilities. CEM permits for a direct assessment of the covariate imbalance
via the L1 statistic. The estimates are based on OLS and standard errors are clustered by the tax
delinquent’s zip code.
Additionally, I exploit the quarterly and monthly nature of income tax payment structure to
estimate the treatment effect on the likelihood of becoming delinquent again. I follow recipients
of a phone call reminder in the first quarter of 2013 for the remainder of the year conditional on
an e-mail reminder. Then, I compare their probability of re-appearing in the delinquency dataset
relative to recipients of an e-mail only.
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Regression Discontinuity Design
Following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), I employ a non-parametric fuzzy regression discontinuity estimator that applies local linear regression on both sides of the e500 cutoff, using a
triangular kernel. This is equivalent to a local linear IV model where I use Ti to instrument for Di
and include its interaction with the first order polynomial of Xi . The fuzzy RD estimand takes the
form of a ratio of two sharp RD estimands: one for the main reduced-form outcome equation (that
is, the regression of g(Yi ) on Xi ) and another for the first-stage equation (that is, the regression of
Ti on Xi ).

ρ=

limc→500− E[Y |X = c] − limc→500+ E[Y |X = c]
limc→500− P[D = 1|X = c] − limc→500+ P[D = 1|X = c]

(6)

Also, I examine the robustness of my findings to the inclusion of a second-order polynomial
(quadratic form). Following Gelman and Imbens (2014), I do not use any higher-order polynomials
because of the unsatisfactorily large values the implicit weights may take, the sensitivity of results
to the order of the polynomial approximation, and the misleading confidence intervals that can be
obtained. The noisiness of the implicit weights can lead to global polynomial regressions that have
both poor coverage and wide confidence intervals. Alternatively, in IV format, the first-stage is:

Di = γ00 + γ01 xi + γ0∗ Ti + γ1∗ xi Ti + ξ1i

(7)
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The second-stage is:

Yi = α + β01 xi + ρDi + β1∗ Di xi + ξ2i

(8)

I re-center at e500 such that zi = xi − 500 and estimate via 2SLS. I re-weight observations
within the bandwidth hIK , putting more emphasis (larger weights pwi ) on those closer to the cutoff
as denoted by the distance zi . I transform the outcome variable using the IHS transformation
g(·) because it leads to a substantial efficiency gains in estimation of the local linear regression
model without the expense of bias. As the average value of Yi is sufficiently larger than zero, the
coefficient ρ could be interpreted in approximately per cent terms. The second stage becomes:

g(Yi ) = α + β01 xi + ρDi + β1∗ Di xi + ξ2i

5

(9)

Results
This section discusses the paper’s results.
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5.1

Baseline Results
Regression Adjustment
Overall, the phone call campaign was successful in that those targeted did bring in more tax rev-

enues to the tax authority. The raw, unadjusted difference in group means is e1199.81, on average,
or approximately e6.279mil. in total. Adjusting with controls, the 5,234 income tax delinquents
who received phone call reminders (following an e-mail reminder) paid an additional e310.68, on
average, or e1.626mil., in total income tax revenues. Partitioning the sample into three classes by
debt size, I find substantially heterogeneous treatment effects. Whereas the smaller- and mediumsized debt holders responded to the phone call reminders by paying more, no discernible difference
in payment behavior by treatment can be reported for those with larger debts. First, I consider income tax delinquencies less than e10,000 which corresponds to approximately 99% of the sample
or 477,240 income tax delinquents. A total of 4,316 tax delinquents received both an e-mail and
phone call reminder as opposed to just an e-mail reminder. The unadjusted and adjusted average treatment effects of the phone call reminders are e588.72 and e178.18, respectively, which
translate to e2.54mil. and e0.769mil. in additional total income tax revenues.
Figure 5 below illustrates the raw differences in payment levels of tax liabilities up to e10,000
per e250 tax liability increment. As expected, the recipients of the phone call reminders paid
more income tax liabilities than those who just received the e-mail reminder. In fact, their payment
levels maintain a robust difference of approximately e180 relative to e-mail recipients over the
entire range of income tax liabilities considered. However, this merely may be evidence of the
underlying selection of the phone call recipients on the basis of a higher likelihood of repayment.
Next, the second class is comprised of 5,050 income tax delinquents with debt levels between
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Figure 5: Naive Estimate of Phone Call Reminder Effect on Income Tax Payments
e10,000 and e100,000 of whom 880 received a phone call reminder. The unadjusted and adjusted
average treatment effects of the phone call reminders are e1046.69 and e982.04, respectively,
which translate to e0.921mil. and e0.864mil. in additional total income tax revenues. Finally, the
largest debtor class ((e100000,e1186515]) includes just 97 income tax delinquents who received
an e-mail reminder of whom 38 also received a phone call reminder. In this case, the raw average
treatment effect of the phone call reminders is e1383.4 but is very imprecisely estimated. When I
adjust the regression estimates with controls, the coefficient turns negative e4500.41 but remains
imprecisely estimated. As a result, the raw gains in tax revenues are equal to e0.052mil but the
adjusted estimate points towards tax losses of e0.171mil.
Coarsened Exact Matching
Pre-processing the data using CEM leads to small decreases in covariate imbalance. A detailed
account of balance across treatment and control for all covariates specified is given in Tables D3
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through D5 in Appendix D. A comparison of the L1 statistic of the pre-matching sample in row
5 to the one of the post-matching sample in rows 6 of Table D6 in Appendix D transparently
shows the large margins of improvement across all PIT liability ranges due to the CEM. Still, the
post-matching covariate imbalance is not entirely eliminated as anticipated by Figure 3.
Table D6 in Appendix D reports the CEM-weighted linear regression estimates of the effect of
incremental informational nudging on tax payments on personal income tax delinquents. A small,
positive but very significant effect is recovered. This is in disagreement with the fuzzy RD estimate.
Yet the statistical significance is smaller over the debt range that coincides with the bandwidth,
somewhat resembling the earlier point estimates. Furthermore, the CEM estimates indicate that
informational nudging has an increasingly weaker behavioral impact on medium-sized and large
debtors.
Figure C3 in Appendix C shows the impact of the combined treatment arm on the probability
of becoming income tax delinquent again. The prediction for the treated individuals is 7.2% lower
and very significant. This test provides suggestive evidence that the effect of information provision
was not ephemeral. An explanation for this result could be increased awareness about the payment
deadlines, overall. It has been argued that taxpayers may become delinquent on their tax liabilities
due to procrastination (Hallsworth et al., 2014). Thus, even if the compliance reminders may have
not improved awareness about the financial penalty, it appears that personal income tax delinquents
became more perceptive of the payment schedule.
Regression Discontinuity Design
Figure 6 illustrates the extensive margin of the estimated effect, focusing on whether any positive payment was received. There is a substantial (5.1%-7.7%) reduction in the repayment rate
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of total PIT delinquencies (including tax arrears). This finding is significant at conventional levels
and robust to the polynomial order used.

Figure 6: Incremental Effect of Phone Calls relative E-mails on Repayment Rate

Figure 7 illustrates the intensive margin of the incremental effect of a neutral information nudge
via phone call on tax compliance. That is, the estimate of interest is the impact of an additional,
phone call compliance reminder given an e-mail reminder on the level of tax payments. It directly
compares the benefits from a treatment arm which is more salient but also more costly to the tax
agency’s baseline. The left panel of Figure 8 presents the LATE at the optimal bandwidth whereas
the right panel shows the LATEs over a range of different bandwidths.

Figure 7: Incremental Effect of Phone Calls relative E-mails on Tax Payments
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There are two main take-aways from Figure 8. First, one can reject with certainty a causal
positive effect of compliance reminders on tax payments. Second, at the optimal bandwidth, there
is a large and statistically significant decrease in tax payments among those who receive an additional phone call compliance reminder following an e-mail reminder. This finding is also given in
tabular form by the 2SLS estimates in Table D7 in Appendix D. The evidence suggests that "soft"
phone call reminders lead to lower tax compliance. Receiving a phone call reminder relative to
just an e-mail reduces tax payments by 41.5% − 39.8% depending on whether a first or a second
polynomial order term for the forcing variable is used. This finding is statistically significant at the
10% level for the outcome transformed by the IHS but not for payments in levels. The width of the
confidence intervals should be attributed to the low power of the local regression analysis.
5.2

Heterogeneity Analysis by Tax Debt Vintage
In this subsection, I investigate why do the compliance reminders backfire in the sense that

they causally reduce tax payments. A potential explanation is that PIT delinquents disregard the
tax authority’s nudging as non-credible. In this case, the tax delinquent’s payment decision may
be driven by her inferred probability of perfect tax debt collection enforcement. Taxpayers with
former experience as tax delinquents may respond differently to a call for payments to those with
no experiences for a number of reasons. For instance, they may treat the tax lien warning reminder
as an inconsequential payment threat if they experienced weak tax debt collection enforcement
in the previous fiscal year. In an attempt to go beyond speculation, I explore the heterogeneity
of the estimated LATEs by debt vintage as a proxy of PIT delinquents’ tax debt collection enforcement experience. That is, I examine whether a compliance reminder led to heterogeneous
taxpayer responses between first-time tax delinquents ("new debtors") and those with tax arrears
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from previous years ("old debtors"). In this setting, the latter were likely exposed to a similar 2012
compliance reminder that sent via e-mail to tax delinquents (2012 treatment status is unobservable
in the present analysis).11 Even if only a fraction of the 2012 delinquent population was exposed to
the earlier compliance reminder, all tax delinquents with tax arrears in 2012 have been exposed to
the intensity of tax debt collection enforcement prior to 2013. If old debtors do not hold onto their
former priors but exhibit adaptive expectations about the probability of perfect tax debt collection
enforcement, then they should revise their expectations downwards given a mere 10% enforcement
of tax liens in 2012 (IMF, 2013). I test whether the payment decision of old and new debtors is
driven by tax debt collection enforcement rather than information nudging by splitting the sample
and estimating the effect of the compliance reminders separately. To counteract the inevitable loss
of power due to sample-splitting, I use substantially wider bandwidths and introduce covariates to
capture the increased variability.
A tabular representation of the 2SLS estimates of the local linear effects of the compliance
reminders by debt vintage as a proxy of tax debt collection enforcement is given in Table D8 in
Appendix D. The behavioral response of new debtors is small as their payment behavior does not
change in a significant way. On the contrary, old debtors do react to the compliance reminders by
paying significantly less. A combined reading of the two implies that the baseline negative result
across the entire population was driven by old debtors’ payment response. The latter were likely recipients of the 2012 e-mail compliance reminders regarding their 2013 tax arrears and experienced
only minimal collection enforcement. Thus, it is appears that the taxpayer responsive is driven
by tax debt collection enforcement rather than information nudging. Generally, tax compliance
11 The tax agency is obliged by law to notify tax delinquents during the initial, one-month grace period about the
interest rate to be accrued prior to the final payment deadline.
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heavily relies on exaggeration of the audit probability by tax authorities and the over-assessment
of their perceived audit probability. This baseline is the likely information set under which new
debtors decide whether to comply or not. However, as the tax authority did not take any further
action (e.g. no levies issued), old debtors learned that, despite their tax delinquency, no further
action would be likely. Thus, the tax authority’s "soft" approach in tackling tax delinquency may
have bred the perception that it is inconsequential. As a result, taxpayers who have acquired that
knowledge from prior interaction with the tax authority are not affected by sanction threats as they
have a corrected perception of the true ramifications of non-compliance. On the contrary, new
debtors are more easily intimidated by the tax authority and, thus, increase payments because they
still operate under an environment of exaggerated audit probabilities. In sum, when information
nudging is framed as an imperative duty by an untrustworthy institution then there is a potential it
may backfire.
5.3

Placebo Test of Tax Debt Collection Enforcement Experience
If taxpayer behavior is indeed driven by perceptions about tax debt collection enforcement

rather than information nudging then, in the absence of the latter, one should expect the former to
maintain its influence over the tax payment decision. I test this hypothesis using the pure control
group of tax delinquents who do not receive any notice from the tax authority at all but vary by
debt vintage. Specifically, I estimate the LATE of being an old debtor on tax payments conditional
on observable characteristics such as tax debt size, age of the delinquent and their quadratics as
well as employment status. Table D9 in Appendix D shows the results of the 2SLS estimation.
As one would expect this tax compliance is influenced by tax debt collection enforcement, being
an old debtor results to a reduction in tax payments. I find small reductions in payments for the
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subset of old debtors relative to new debtors. This finding is statistically significant only for the
estimation in levels in column (1). The influence of former experiences of tax debt collection
enforcement that was extremely weak (11% collection rate in 2012) on tax payments is negative.
The evidence from the specification augmented by taxpayer characteristics does not hint towards
any other potential explanation for this finding. Again, it appears that weak tax debt collection
enforcement is instrumental for the tax payment decision.

6

Robustness: Validity of Regression-Discontinuity Design
This section includes a number of robustness checks surrounding the validity of the RDD. I

follow the recommended "checklist" for implementation of RDDs by Lee and Lemieuxa (2010).
The following subsections address every potential issue that relates to the analysis, presentation,
and estimation of the RDD in succession.
6.1

Manipulation of Forcing Variable: McCrary’s Density Test
The fundamental condition for identification in fuzzy RD is continuity of the conditional ex-

pectation of counterfactual outcomes in the forcing variable. McCrary (2008) notes that these
continuity assumptions may be invalid if individuals can manipulate the reported value of the forcing variable; i.e., the level of PIT liability. To this end, I test the discontinuity in the density at the
e500 cutoff (left panel of Figure 8). Graphically, I look for evidence of one-sided manipulation
of total liabilities. A smooth density function would suggest that there was no manipulation of the
forcing variable. However, the evidence suggests that this is not the case. There appears to be a
jump immediately after the cutoff. An excess mass of PIT liabilities at e500 leads to the observed
jump in the density estimates. At first blush, it seems that there is evidence of manipulation of the
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reported tax liability on behalf of the tax delinquents to receive a phone call compliance reminder.
I argue that the jump in the density of the forcing variable at the cutoff is not evidence of manipulation but simply rounding. For example, consider the right panel of Figure 8: even over regions that
are irrelevant to the treatment assignment rule, there is a sharp increase in the density estimates of
just above e300 and e400 as well.

Figure 8: McCrary’s Density Test of Manipulation of Forcing Variable - Full Sample

Kleven and Waseem (2013) similarly encounter the potential of rounding in income reporting
in Pakistan and particularly for the case of self-employed taxpayers. Following their approach
in addressing rounding, I split the sample by those whose tax liability is reported in hundred
eincrements ("rounders") and those who do not ("non-rounders").12 Figure 9 presents the equivalent McCrary’s density tests to Figure 8 ones’ for the subsample of non-rounders. The resulting
estimates of the density of PIT liabilities indicate a smooth underlying distribution in both panels.
Now there is no evidence of bunching of PIT liabilities above the cut-off. If anything, there is minimal bunching at e25 increments now over the [300, 500) region; again, a by-product of a natural
12 Alternatively,

Kleven and Waseem (2013) also specify fixed effects at multiples of income increments where
rounding might occur. But, this alternative approach is more applicable in their context that focuses on the estimation
of the global empirical distribution of the outcome variable rather than locally examining the smoothness of the forcing
variable.
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tendency towards rounding.

Figure 9: McCrary’s Density Test of Manipulation of Forcing Variable - Non-rounders Sample

In sum, the results of the successive McCrary’s density tests of manipulation of the forcing
variable do not suggest that it would be a mistake to view the treatment assignment rule as quasirandom.
6.2

Inspection of Baseline Covariates: Parallel RDD Test
An indirect approach for testing the validity of the RDD is to assess to what extent the observed

baseline covariates are "locally" balanced on either side of the threshold, such that treatment assignment can be considered as locally randomized. This test is first conducted graphically where
the outcome variable is replaced with observed baseline covariates. Therefore, one should expect a
smooth, continuous distribution of covariate averages across the cut-off. A discontinuity would violate the identifying assumption that predicts local random assignment. Figure 10 below presents
combined evidence from the parallel RDD test. The x-axis presents the binned averages of the
forcing variable in e1 increments over the optimal bandwidth of e10.90. The y-axis contains
the pseudo-dependent variable. This exercise is a placebo test in that no substantial discontinu-
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ity to the left and to the right of the cut-off should be apparent in the binned averages of the
pseudo-outcomes. The latter are comprised of covariates that were determined prior to the realization of the phone-call campaign such as sex, age, and employment status (indicators for salaried,
self-employed, and unemployed PIT delinquent individuals). I also examine the continuity of old
debtor status around the cut-off since tax arrears were formed before the phone-call campaign.

Figure 10: Inspection of Baseline Covariates: Parallel RDD Test

The distribution of the e1 binned averages over the optimal bandwidth is smooth for four out
of a total of six baseline covariates. There appears to be a small, 5% difference in the averages
of the fraction of self-employed and salaried individuals around the cut-off. However, the large
confidence intervals around the point estimates at every e1 bin average imply that no statistically
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discernible differences below and above the cut-off are present.
The graphical evidence of no discontinuity in baseline covariate around the cut-off above is
complemented by a formal computational test of covariate balance. Specifically, I am t-tests to assess whether average covariate values below and above the cut-off are statistically different within
the optimal bandwidth. If the p-value’s is less than 0.1, 0.05, or 0.01 then the mean difference
between the baseline covariate’s observations just below and just above the cut-off is statistically
significantly different from zero. The results are shown in Table D10 in Appendix D. Around the
cut-off, the sample of tax delinquents is well-balanced with regards to male, the old debtor, and
the unemployed baseline covariates within the optimal bandwidth. However, there is a statistically
discernible difference in the fraction of the tax delinquent population around the cut-off with regards in age, salaried and self-employed employment status. Nevertheless, these differences are
essentially indistinguishable from a policy perspective. For instance, the largest discrepancy in
means is for self-employed employment status from 21.1% for those below as opposed to 22.5%
for those above the cutoff. Thus, the inspection of discontinuity in baseline covariates shows that
the validity of the RDD based on the arbitrary e500 cut-off is valid. Locally, treatment assignment
is as good as random.
6.3

Strength of e500 Cut-off as an Instrument
Another reason of caution about the fuzzy RD estimates could stem if the e500 cutoff was not a

strong instrument of treatment assignment. However, the plots of the first stage for PIT delinquent
individuals confirm that the cutoff is a very strong instrument of treatment assignment. This could
have also been predicted by the high adherence to the treatment assignment rule as demonstrated
by the histogram in Figure 4 in the exploratory data analysis. Figure C2 in Appendix C show
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an arguably flat line at zero probability for income tax delinquents with liabilities under e500
and a marginally sloped line for those with liabilities just above the cutoff. One could interpret the
flatness of the probability estimate after e500 as evidence that the cutoff is not a strong instrument.
However, the jump in the probability of receiving treatment after the cutoff is simply masked by
the very large number of untreated observations. Even if the jump is not stark due to the existence
of cross-overs, there is still very high adherence to the rule with virtually no phone call recipients
with total tax liabilities less than e500.
7

Conclusions
This study examines the effect of information nudging on payments of overdue tax liabilities

in Greece. Overall, the campaign targeting personal income tax delinquents who are more likely to
pay did increase tax revenues. This findings echo the recent policy change by the TCU to adopt email only informational nudging. However, I find that information nudges via phone calls may not
causally enhance tax compliance in a context of low tax morale. In fact, unintended consequences
are possible as the reduced tax payments for tax delinquents at the e500 cutoff.
The results in this paper are largely consistent with other studies in the literature showing that
simple contact from the tax agency can have a substantial impact on taxpayer behavior, at any
direction. Guyton et al. (2016) find that the mere receipt of a neutral information reminder can
induce taxpayer responses, at least in the short run. It is important to note that this study similarly finds that even simple information provision to a taxpayer can induce behavioral responses
that generate both gains and losses to the tax agency. Specifically, they find that the treatment
individuals were more likely both to claim refunds and pay taxes owed. Hallsworth et al. (2014)
uses a similar neutral, non-deterrent informational nudge as the control group letter to just inform
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personal income tax delinquents about the deadline and payment methods. They report a small
but positive and significant effect on tax payments. Furthermore, Bott et al. (2014) used a base
treatment of neutral information provision which closely resembles the one examined in this study.
Specifically, their base treatment involved a mailed letter containing information about where and
when to submit the tax returns and why foreign income is subject to income taxation. Following
the receipt of the base treatment, they report substantial taxpayer responses in foreign income reporting. My findings are reversed and remind that "soft" nudging on behalf of the tax agency will
not necessarily enhance compliance. In this regard, my results are in agreement with Fellner et al.
(2009) and Ariel (2012) who report that potential individual evaders of TV license fees in Austria
and firms in Israel responded to communication by the tax agency by registering to pay license
fees and reporting corporate income tax less. On the contrary, empirical evidence suggests that increased compliance among taxpayers with substantial prior-year audit assessments (Erard, 1992).
Regarding the effectiveness of different delivery devices, Ortega and Scartascini (2015) find phone
calls to be more effective than e-mails in motivating individuals to pay overdue tax liabilities. On
the contrary, I find that the salience of the nudging technology does not necessarily guarantee better outcomes for the tax agency. On the contrary, factors such as prior experience in tax delinquent
status are more important in shaping individual beliefs about debt collection enforcement. Weak
prior debt collection enforcement renders information nudging non-credible which, in turn, leads
to lower tax revenues.
Finally, it should be noted that the study, at its current form, is subject to an important limitation. The empirical analysis does not account for spatial factors. However, taxpayer location may
affect her payment behavior either through the horizontal tax reciprocity channel given the disproportionately higher public spending in Athens (due to events such as the 2004 Olympics) relative
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to the rest of Greece or because of the inherently weaker tax debt collection enforcement in distant
location. Currently, the analysis is only allowing the unobservables of tax delinquents to be correlated by clustering standard errors at the zip-code level. Introducing location fixed effects will
be a first step in assessing the extent of geographical heterogeneity. However, including additional
covariates in the outcome equation of the 2SLS model in uncommon in RDDs. Moving forward
with this project, I will bring-in GIS data on (centroid) distance between the tax delinquent’s zip
code and the national (Athens) and regional capitals as well as the nearest tax office. This new
information will allow me to go beyond simply controlling for time-invariant characteristics that
are specific to the region or the zip-code. Complemented with information on driving times, it
will permit a rigorous examination of the horizontal tax reciprocity channel. More importantly, it
will provide with a meaningful measure of variation in tax debt collection enforcement. Tax delinquents situated in harder-to-reach locations from the tax authority’s perspective (e.g. island without
a tax office) are likely subject to weaker tax debt collection enforcement. Since reminders are the
same independent of tax delinquent location, I will exploit the influence of Greek geography as
identifying variation in tax debt collection enforcement.
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Essay 2: Housing Bubbles and Zoning Corruption: Evidence from Greece and Spain
1. Introduction
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in January 1, 1999 and the circulation
of the euro in January 1, 2002 led to significant changes in the financing systems of many EMU
member countries. Cheap credit and a surge in intra-EMU capital flows with the perception of a
dramatic decrease in Southern-Europe financial risk transformed the economies of some of the
peripheral countries such as Greece and Spain. The aim of this paper is to examine whether the
housing bubbles experienced by Greece and Spain in the years preceding the Great Recession of
2008 exacerbated corruption of zoning officials. The mechanism under study worked as follows.
Financial markets' perception of risk convergence among EMU member states significantly reduced
the cost of mortgage lending in its periphery. The availability of cheap credit in Greece and Spain
sparked an increase in economic activity excessively focused on housing construction. Gopinath et
al. (2015) develop a theoretical framework that shows how the decline in the real interest rate in
the southern EMU member states, often attributed to the euro convergence process, led to a
decline in sectoral total factor productivity because capital inflows were misallocated toward
investments that were not necessarily the most productive. The housing bubbles that ensued
created significant new profit opportunities for housing developers while zoning officials’ corruption
penalties remained unchanged. As a result, the real estate boom in Greece and Spain altered housing
developers' incentives to offer illegal bribes for land rezoning and officials' incentives to accept
them. Other than discussions in the popular media of the potential link between the housing bubbles
and zoning corruption, to date there has not been any formal testing of this relationship.1

1

For an example of a discussion of the potential link between housing bubbles and corruption in the media for the case of China
see the “China Daily” of April 22nd 2014: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-10/08/content_11382933.htm. Bujko et al.
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To better understand the underlying process it is important to highlight the institutional
designs that mortgage markets in Greece and Spain followed. Unlike the US experience, neither
government acted as a significant mortgage insurer (like the Federal Housing Administration in the
US) nor did they sponsor institutions that did so (like Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac also in the US)
over the period of analysis. In fact, the Greek government guaranteed only 4 percent of standing
mortgages and the Spanish government none at all. In addition, borrowers in Greece and Spain were
fully exposed to the risks associated with servicing mortgage loans with draconian personal
bankruptcy laws. Finally, Greek and Spanish households were able to continue to deduct primarydwelling mortgage interest rate payments from individual income tax liability, as had been the case
before the introduction of the euro. Thus, the variation in the mortgage interest rates that followed
the introduction of the euro was the main –if not the only- mechanism affecting the decision of
taking out a mortgage loan by Greek and Spanish households.
The story line we weave together in this paper starts with a dramatic drop in mortgage
interest rates in Greece and Spain following EMU accession and their stabilization at historically
low rates, thereafter. Figure 10 below shows the evolution of the benchmark mortgage interest
rates on new housing loans in Greece and Spain from January 2000 through December 2005.
This period corresponds to two years before and four after the adoption of the euro in 2002. We
consider only the last two years leading to the EMU because the Spanish and, especially, the
Greek economies were among the last to converge to EMU's inflationary criterion of 3 percent.
For Greece, we present the trajectory of the interest rate on euro-denominated housing loans at a
floating rate. It is a good benchmark of lending costs in Greece because the majority of euro-

(2015) uses corruption as an independent variable to explain “land grabbing” when here housing prices is the key independent
variable that determines zoning corruption.
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denominated housing loans from domestic credit institutions to households until December 2006
were arranged on a variable rate basis.2 In Spain, mortgages typically featured a variable (or
adjustable) rate determined by the lender. We depict the evolution of the most widely used
benchmark in retail-banking in Spain; i.e., the one-year EURIBOR rate (Bank of Spain, 2013).

Figure 11: Mortgage Lending Benchmark Interest Rates, January 2000 – December 2005
Source: Bank of Greece, Bank of Spain
The average monthly rate in Greece and Spain from January 2000 through December
2001 were 6.87 percent and 4.43 percent, respectively. However, over the next two years these
figures markedly declined to a 5.01 percent (a 27 percent decrease) and a 2.91 percent (a 34
percent decrease) average, respectively. These are large swings, especially considering that they
represent two-year averages. Indeed, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggests that mortgage lending
in Greece and Spain was significantly cheaper two years after accession in the EMU than before

2

Housing loans in non-euro currencies represented 2.5 percent of the total and their rates are not presented.
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with very high precision. Therefore, we take these as evidence that the housing markets in
Greece and Spain experienced substantial decreases in mortgage lending that we exploit as
identifying variation.
These substantial reductions in the cost of borrowing prompted many more households in
Greece and Spain to enter the mortgage market. Between 1999 and 2007, the average annual
growth rate of loans for house purchase in Greece was 30.3 percent (the highest among
Eurozone-founding member states), and in Spain 19.8 percent (third highest) whereas the volume
of mortgages in the EMU as a whole grew only by 10.4 percent (ECB Structural Issues Report,
2009).
The significant growth in housing finance and the associated strong increase in housing
demand resulted in a rapid increase in construction. Housing starts per 100 dwellings in Greece
grew from 1.6 in 1999 to 2.1 in 2004 and in Spain from 1.5 in 1999 to 1.6 in 2007. In contrast,
average housing starts in the EMU remained stable at 1.1 dwellings during the same period (ECB
Structural Issues Report, 2009).
There are many potential determinants of housing prices and causality between interest
rates and housing prices cannot be established from observational inference. Low interest rates
do not necessarily lead to housing price increases as the recent housing markets in the US,
Greece, and Spain have shown but a link between monetary policy and housing prices has been
firmly documented (Sutton, 2002; Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004; Holt, 2009). Several studies have
identified a positive relationship between housing prices and the availability of credit (mortgage
lending) in Greece (Himoniti-Terroviti, 2005; Brissimis and Vlassopoulos, 2009) and Spain
(Gimeno y Martínez-Carrascal, 2006; Gentier, 2012). The unprecedented supply of cheap credit
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due to the adoption of the euro added impetus to the pre-existing inflationary trend of nominal
housing prices in Greece and Spain that followed the general inflation. This paper uses the
transition to the euro and the associated windfall in mortgage lending in Greece and Spain to
exploit the ensuing housing bubble as an exogenous shock that increased zoning corruption.3
This interpretation of the role played by the euro on housing prices in both countries is supported
by the data. Figures 12 and 13 below plot the average national housing price per square meter in
Greece and Spain from the adoption of the euro (January 2002) till the end of the period of our
analysis (December 2008), respectively. We use the innovational outlier (IO) unit root test
statistic by Clemente, Montanes, and Reyes (1998) to identify the existence of a structural break
in the housing price time series.

Figure 12: Housing Prices in Greece and EMU creation (2002), 3rd Quarter of 2002 – 3rd Quarter
of 2008
Source: Bank of Greece, Real Estate Market Analysis

3

We cannot exclude the possibility that zoning corruption itself may have had an effect on housing prices (reverse causality). But
note that zoning corruption works to increase the supply of housing—shifting the supply curve rightward as more buildable land
becomes available—and therefore putting downward pressure on housing prices. As Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) note,
fewer and shorter bubbles with smaller price swings should be expected in regions with more elastic housing supply. Sowell
(2009) finds that the largest housing price increases occurred in housing markets where local governments imposed land use
restrictions which reduced the supply of available land for housing. Even if a causal loop between housing prices and zoning
corruption is at play, the direction of the bias suppresses the magnitudes of our estimates and, thus, making our results more
conservative.
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Figure 13: Housing Prices in Spain and EMU creation (2002), 3rd Quarter of 2002 – 3rd Quarter
of 2008
Source: Spanish Ministry of Public Works
In both countries, a structural break in the time series of housing prices occurred within
two years after the the adoption of the euro.4 This provides formal evidence that housing markets
in Greece and Spain underwent substantial changes following the adoption of the euro.
Following Rose-Ackerman (1975), in this paper we define zoning corruption as "special
treatments" of housing developers by zoning officials for personal gain. These "special
treatments" usually took the form of granting illegal building permits in Greece and the rezoning
of land tracts for residential and commercial use in Spain. The causal mechanisms that determine
the supply and demand for "special treatment" may work either through the incentives
individuals face or through the opportunities to actually engage in zoning corruption.

4

This statistic is preferred to the Perron-Vongels and and Zivot-Andrews statistics because it can capture more than one
structural breaks in the time series while retaining its ability to identify only one (Baum, 2001).
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First, we discuss how increased financial incentives favored more zoning corruption.
Surging housing prices in combination with fixed, inflation-adjusted construction costs
(Brissimis et al., 2007) and decreasing lending costs meant greater profit opportunities for
housing developers. As new housing construction projects became more profitable, this provided
housing developers with larger incentives to bribe. As Rose-Ackerman (1988, p.278) puts it, “if
bribes are offered there must be some prospective excess profits out of which to pay them”. The
size of the bribe may be related to the structure of uncertainty about the expected costs a corrupt
zoning official faces (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). In essence, the surge in housing prices increased
the expected benefits to developers of extending a bribe to a zoning official (Becker, 1968).
It is important to also highlight the opportunities for zoning officials to engage in
corruption. The institutional framework in Greece and Spain hugely empowered zoning officials
on urban planning matters. Decision making on zoning issues was at the local level and the
process was overseen by municipal authorities only. As Tanzi (1998, p.14) has noted: “decisions
as to the particular use of private land (zoning laws) that determine whether the same piece of
land can be used only for agriculture, and thus have low market value, or for high rise buildings,
and thus can be very expensive… are prone to bribery”. The natural variation in the supply of
housing and zoning laws made land a commodity of differential value across regions. The
opportunity for zoning corruption remained available since the zoning officials' audit probability
remained unchanged. The delay of necessary institutional reforms could be attributed to the
bonanza years of expanding incomes and rising tax revenues in the EU periphery (FernándezVillaverde et al., 2013). Therefore, the expected costs to violators remained stable leaving the
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willingness to accept a bribe and the supply of special treatment unchanged.5 Bribing
opportunities persisted as long as government-generated shortages in the form of zoning laws
and regulations were in place (Lee, 1994). In a way, the institutional setup allowed zoning
officials to function as “discriminating monopolists fixing market clearing rates for the services
being offered” (Jagannathan, 1986).
For our baseline results, and based on the availability and nature of the data, we estimate
separate negative binomial models for each country. We model corruption counts using monthly
regional data from 2003 through 2008 in Greece and quarterly regional data from 2006 through
2008 in Spain. We find a positive and significant association between housing prices and zoning
corruption. The non-constant marginal effects indicate that zoning corruption increased at a
faster rate than housing prices. Our baseline findings are robust to a series of robustness checks.
We estimate zero-inflated variants of the unconditional negative binomial model to test whether
our baseline model is mis-specified. We investigate different specifications to address any
omitted variable bias concerns. We estimate linear models to assess the validity of the
“memoryless” property embedded in the count data analysis, and the importance of dynamic
panel bias, particularly for the case of Spain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the empirical
literature on the determinants of corruption. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology and
Section 4 presents the baseline results. Section 5 discusses econometric issues pertaining to our
analysis, and addresses them in a succession of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.

5

Of course, housing bubbles make acceptance of a bribe relatively more appealing to zoning officials when it is not accompanied
by a tightening of the penalties associated with misconduct (Aidt, 2003).
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2. Review of the Literature on the Determinants of Corruption
Much of the empirical literature on corruption has been hampered by the use of
subjective measures of corruption and the lack of a proper identification strategy. The first wave
of empirical studies of the determinants of corruption, often cross-national analyses, made use of
subjective measures of corruption from survey data from Transparency International Global
Corruption Barometer, the United Nations World Value Survey, and the World Bank Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI).6 The main weakness of this literature is some well-known
shortcomings with the use of subjective measures of corruption. Subjective measures of
corruption rely on perceptions or on personal experiences of bribery. Surveys use responses of
businesses or households to questionnaires that inquire whether or not they have ever given an
illegal payment to a public official, or their opinion about how corrupt the government is.
However, individuals or businesses may want to mask their actual behavior in survey responses
to avoid potential penalties or further actions. As a result, subjective measures of corruption may
be plagued by imprecision (Kaufman et al., 2010). In addition, systematic biases may undermine
empirical analysis when different classes of respondents differ by design, or when the ideological
orientation of the institution matters. In addition, subjective assessments might be driven by
“halo effects”; i.e., negative evaluations when conditions are worsening and vice versa. Finally,
when different data providers use each other’s evaluations, endogeneity is introduced since
perception errors are correlated. In this paper we bypass the aforementioned challenges by

There has been a host of studies based on the survey’s data. Just to mention some of the findings in this literature on the
determinants of corruption, Serra (2006) conducts a cross-country Global Sensitivity meta-analysis and finds that income, history
of democratic institutions, Protestant religion, colonial heritage, and political instability are all robust determinants of corruption.
Mauro (1997), Beets (2005), Lederman et al. (2005), and Cheung and Chan (2008) report a negative association between
education level and corruption; however, Frechette (2006) arrives at the opposite conclusion. Beets (2005) finds that higher levels
of unemployment are associated with higher corruption and Emerson (2006) finds a negative relation between market
competition and subjective measures of corruption. Lambsdorff (2006), Svensson (2005), Beets (2005), Treisman (2000), Husted
(1999), Mauro (1997), and Chang (2010) find a negative association between income level and corruption. On the contrary,
Braun and Di Tella (2004) and Frechette (2006) find GDP per capita to be positively correlated with corruption using panel data.
6
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employing objective counts of corruption. We measure actual counts of zoning corruption
coming from public records in Greece counts and media reports in Spain. The data are described
extensively in section 3.1 below.
The literature on corruption has also struggled with the lack of proper identification
strategies. Due to the practical difficulties in conducting natural field experiments on corruption,
only very limited evidence from the field exists. And by design, these studies can only reveal
effective approaches to curbing corruption rather than identifying its causal determinants. Olken
(2007) did carry out a field experiment in over 600 Indonesian village road projects to find that
government audits reduced corruption significantly whereas increased grassroots participation in
monitoring had negligible effects. The absence of clear-cut comparative case study settings has
prevented the use of standard quasi-experimental techniques to study corruption. As a result, the
methodology employed has been typically restricted to either instrumental variable (IV) and
dynamic panel techniques or has exploited instances of exogenous, natural variation in the
determinants of corruption.
Some of these studies include Ferraz and Finan (2009) who use audits of incumbent
municipal politicians to construct enhanced measures of corruption that control for unobserved
characteristics of the locale. Based on reduced-form as well as IV techniques, Brollo et al. (2013)
report that an increase in federal transfers in Brazil by 10 percent amplifies the incidence of
severe corruption by about 16 percent. Following the same designs, Dong and Torgler (2013)
report that Chinese provinces with resource abundance exhibit greater corruption whereas higher
educational attainment and fiscal decentralization leads to significantly less corruption. Batzilis
(2014) uses a IV approach to show that electoral competition at the municipality level reduced
public spending corruption in Greece. Also, he finds a higher incidence of corrupt spending in
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less populated, more rural municipalities. Del Monte and Papagni (2007) apply an autoregressive
distributed lag model to regional data from 1963 through 2001 in Italy to investigate the
determinants of corruption, defined as crimes against the public administration reported to the
police. They find that per capita GDP, public expenditure on consumption goods and services,
and institutional and judiciary changes are the most important contributors to public corruption
in Italy.
A different strand of the empirical literature has relied on instances of natural resource
windfalls as sources of exogenous variation to examine corruption. Maldonado (2010) exploits
exogenous variation in economic conditions in Peru from mineral price shocks due to the relative
abundance of mineral resources across regions. His results suggest that the increases in transfer
funds due to positive shocks in international mineral prices affected corrupt practices in citizens’
interactions with public officials, and that these corrupt practices differed according to the size of
the shock. Caselli and Michaels (2013) use variation in oil output among Brazilian
municipalities that was exogenously dictated by world oil prices to find evidence of
embezzlement in oil-rich municipalities. It is in this latter strain of the empirical literature where
our paper fits. Similarly to those papers, we exploit variation in corruption incentives (rents
reflected by housing prices) that naturally occurred following the adoption of the euro in Greece
and Spain. We focus on a period of housing bubbles as documented by structural breaks in the
residential property price time series. The steep acceleration in housing prices allows us to
identify their role in zoning officials' corruption motives separately from other confounding
factors of corruption.

57

3. Empirical Analysis
We conduct separate empirical analyses for Greece and Spain. We refrain from pooling
the observations from the two countries because that would be responsible for a large fraction of
the overall variation. Even though Greece and Spain are not dramatically different in many
respects, there are significant institutional and economic differences.7 Furthermore, the
observations of zoning corruption are coming from distinct data generating processes for each
country. This is why we estimate parameters using a panel of a single country at a time, and,
thus, exploit greater cross-sectional variation due to the regional disaggregation.
Given the within-country nature of our study, we assume institutional homogeneity; i.e.,
relative wages of zoning officials and anti-corruption efforts by auditors are equal across regions,
within country. This may be quite appropriate given the nationwide salary base and trends that
applied in each country. It is also an empirical necessity because controls of institutional quality
such as “Rule of Law” and “Quality of the Bureaucracy” are only available at the national level
for the period of analysis.8 And even though the low mortgage interest rates that triggered the
housing bubbles in Greece and Spain were uniformly available across regions, it could be argued
that there may still be differences in the quality of public administration. This would imply
substantial regional heterogeneity in the level of corrupt activities but does not seem to be the
case as discussed below. Our analysis captures regional institutional differences through the
inclusion of education attainment as a control variable. Education is often regarded as a proxy of
overall development and has been found to correlate with enhanced government performance

For example, Golden (2015) argues that “there is little likelihood that Spain, for instance, will tumble to Greece’s…levels of
corruption”.
8
An exception is the European Quality of Government Index (EQI), which is the result of novel survey data on corruption and
governance at the regional level within the EU, conducted first in 2010 and then again in 2013. However, these survey data only
cover years later than the scope of our analysis
7
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and reduced levels of evasion.9 Lastly, any time-invariant, region-specific characteristics we
failed to control are captured by regional dummies. Arguably, these should capture the bulk of
institutional differences among regions given the slowly-adjusting nature of institutional quality.
3.1

Data
Our main dependent variable is an objective (non-perception, non-survey-based) metric

of corruption: legal indictments of zoning officials from prosecution records in Greece, and
zoning corruption scandals reported in the media in Spain. In both cases, zoning corruption is
measured at the regional level. The observations of the zoning corruption are non-negative and
discrete; thus, they qualify as count data (Bujko et al., 2015).
In the case of Greece, information comes from monthly prosecution records of zoning
officials by the Inspectors-Controllers Body for Public Administration of Greece from January
2003 through December 2008. This is an internal audit service of the public administration
which independently monitors all public officials in Greece.10 There are six characterizations of
public administration malpractices, each of which reflects a different degree of corruption
intensity. We only use the most extreme case of zoning corruption intensity to make results for
Greece directly comparable to those for Spain. More importantly, it allows us to rule out the
possibility that increased counts of zoning corruption are due to the reporting of multiple
prosecutions of the same defendant. The use of corruption audits data is a relatively recent
development in the literature, but it is becoming more prevalent. A number of studies has relied
on corruption audits data as the research community is becoming increasingly more engaged and
9

See, for example, Mauro (1997), Beets (2005), Lederman et al. (2005), and Cheung and Chan (2008).
The data were obtained during our personal visit to the Inspectors unit in Athens in August 2014. Inspections are delineated
into 16 categories that fully describe the nature of the violation. The six corruption-related categories incorporated in our measure
of the dependent variable are: (1) Corruption - Other Legal Indictments; (2) Illegal Action; (3) Organizational Problems; (4)
Violations of Code of Conduct; (5) Violation of Transparency; (6) Omission of Designated Action.
10
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works directly work with public officials for the improvement of the quality of the public
administration (Olken, 2007; Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Caselli and Michaels, 2013; Brollo et al.,
2013).
The data on zoning corruption in Spain were obtained from the GISAS Research Group
at the University of La Laguna in Spain. Although the original dataset comprised corruption
scandals from 2000 to 2008, just 3 per cent of the counts were recorded for the period 20002005. This is the case because information for these two periods was collected independently by
different sources. To prevent measurement error from combining information by two different
data generating processes, we discard any observations prior to 2006. The dependent variable for
Spain represents the quarterly number of media reports of zoning corruption scandals from the
first quarter of 2006 to the fourth quarter of 2008. These scandals involve real estate crimes
committed by zoning officials at the municipal level, and are aggregated up to the regional level.
The calculus of corruption counts is based on web-scrapping of media reports. This approach of
corruption enumeration is not new. It has been used in previous studies of public corruption in
Spain (Fundación Alternativas, 2007; Costas-Pérez et al., 2012), financial scandals and election
law violations in Japan (Nyblade and Reed, 2008) and oil revenue embezzlement in Brazil
(Caselli and Michaels, 2013). As a matter of fact, the same dataset has already been used in
publications that examine the impact of zoning corruption on political outcomes (Martín-Martín
et al., 2010; Jerez-Darias et al., 2012).
Housing prices is the key explanatory variable used in the analysis and reflects profit
incentives for bribing. They are measured in euros per square meter. We use this normalization
to account for any effects the size of property may have on its price. Considering merely
contemporaneous prices we cannot explore whether a rise in housing prices triggered zoning
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corruption in a future time period. To account for the time-consuming process a corruption count
takes to mature we use 18-month housing price lags.11 This corresponds to the average duration
for a dwelling to be constructed in Greece and accounts for the time required for the gradual
exposure and media coverage of a zoning scandal indictment in Spain.
For Greece, housing prices are constructed based on the Housing Price Index compiled
by the Real Estate Market Analysis Section of the Bank of Greece. Four time series are available
of which only two perfectly match our regional disaggregation for Greece. We interact these
time series with actual median residential property prices from Mitrakos et al. (2014) to
introduce further cross-sectional housing price variation. The latter study provides information
on 28 cities across 12 regions of Greece. For the one region which is not covered in Mitrakos et
al. (2014), we use its neighboring region’s housing price information. Our results are robust to
the exclusion of the region for which we lack a local housing indicator. Housing prices are
expressed as housing prices per square meter in a region of Greece.
For Spain, housing prices were extracted from the website of the Spanish Ministry of
Public Works and Transport and match regions perfectly. They represent property values of new
housing units per square meter from 2000 through 2008 in quarterly frequency. We use values
earlier than 2006 to create the necessary housing price lags without sacrificing any zoning
corruption observations when differencing.

11

The use of lags of independent variables to study corruption is not novel. In a study of the regional determinants
of corruption in Italy, Del Monte and Papagni (2007) also resort to lagged terms because “time is needed for
bargaining” and inaccuracies may arise between committing and reporting the corrupt activity.
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Next, we use the number of new building permits to approximate the window of
opportunity of zoning corruption. Figures 14 and 15 below plot zoning corruption and building
permit averages for each region in Greece and Spain, respectively, without adjusting for regional
population. However, confounding will arise if housing prices and zoning corruption have
common causes that we fail to condition on.

Figure 14: Average Zoning Corruption and New Building Permits per Region in Greece

Figure 15: Average Zoning Corruption and New Building Permits per Region in Spain
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Note that the ratio of the zoning corruption mean to the building permit mean is fairly
constant across regions within Greece and within Spain. First, this is encouraging for the validity
of our design because it illustrates that the opportunity to engage in zoning corruption followed a
common pattern, across regions, as the institutional and judicial uniformity we assumed, within
country, would suggest. Second, the predictive power of building permits demonstrates its
appropriateness as the exposure variable in our modeling. In Greece, the notable deviation from
the corruption-permit country ratio is for Attica, the region of Athens. This could be explained by
its extremely high population density (highest among all 30 EMU regions we consider). If
population density is operationalized through higher-rise buildings then the number of new
building permits need not be as large as in other regions. In addition, the fact that the
homeownership rate in Greece was high even before the adoption of the euro implies smaller new
building needs at the largest population center. As a matter of fact, many new residential properties
in Greece were constructed as second-home properties in regions where tourism is prevalent such
as the South and North Aegean and the Ionian Islands for residents from the large cities. The fact
that Central Macedonia, a region of Thessaloniki, the second largest city in Greece, exhibits a large
number of new building permits could be attributed to the presence of a major tourist destination
in the region (Chalkidiki) where second-home housing construction grew substantially post-EMU.
In Spain, Catalonia stands out with a much smaller zoning corruption to building permit ratio
compared to other regions in Spain. Its capital, Barcelona, is considered a top haven for expatriate
retirees with an estimated population of over 35,000. 12 The associated increased demand for
housing is one of the contributing factors for such outlier behavior. And, similarly to the experience
we document for the case of Greece, demand from individuals of landlocked regions that

12

9 Top Havens for Expat Retirees: http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/on-retirement/2014/08/28/9-top-havens-for-expatretirees
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experienced steep growth such as in Madrid, Leon, Aragon, and Extremadura who are seeking a
coastal second-home could also explain part of the excess construction as these individuals are
entering the housing market seeking new coastal establishments.
Besides housing prices and building permits, we allow for other factors to influence the
proclivity of public officials towards corruption on the basis of findings in the within-country
literature on the determinants of corruption. For our baseline estimation we adjust for the
unemployment rate, population, population density, and the enrollment rate in tertiary education.
All control variables are obtained from Eurostat’s regional statistics portal. They are available at
the regional level (EU classification: NUTS level 2); the latter three in annual frequency and
unemployment in quarterly frequency.
The measurement of education attainment via enrollment rates in tertiary (higher and
continuing) education may be subject to bias because large metropolitan areas feature more tertiary
educational institutions, skewing enrollment rates higher in more populous regions. However, this
concern is mitigated by the fact that public tertiary education is uniformly provided across regions
of Greece and Spain, a feature that is quite common across public continental European education
systems. Literacy rates are an alternative measure commonly found in past empirical research but
would have yielded negligible variation across regions given the EMU context.
Population measures the number of inhabitants in a region (all ages, both sexes). A
combined reading of Figures F.1 through F.4 in Appendix F reveal that construction activity is
positively related to increases in population. The highest counts of zoning corruption are recorded
in the most populous regions in both Greece and Spain; Attica and Andalucía, respectively. This
mechanically widens the window of opportunity for corruption in more populous regions. Thus,
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we include population to control for any population size effects (level effects) on the counts of
zoning corruption. Clearly, more populous regions will be mechanically associated with higher
demand for housing.
Population density measures the number of inhabitants in a region (all ages, both sexes)
per square kilometer. We believe that population density is an important determinant of zoning
corruption because it affects its monitoring intensity. In densely populated regions, more people
compete for land. This produces more checks on the performance of the zoning officials and,
subsequently, less corruption. As a matter of fact, in Greece most zoning corruption is exposed
after adjacent residential property owners file a complaint to the public administration auditors.
This, in turn, triggers investigation of the case by the auditors. If any misconduct on behalf of the
zoning official is revealed, arraignment ensues. Our zoning corruption observations for Greece
come from the subset of arraigned officials that were, eventually, legally indicted. In essence, more
“eyes” provide more checks of corrupt zoning activity.
We use the unemployment rates of individuals aged 15 years or over for both sexes as a
predictor of housing demand. GDP could have alternatively been used to proxy housing demand.
However, since GDP is more strongly correlated with housing prices this would have attenuated
our coefficient of interest.13

13

Indeed, housing prices are more collinear with GDP (ρ= 0.29 for Greece; ρ= 0.68 for Spain) than unemployment

(ρ=-0.28 for Greece; ρ= -0.14 for Spain)
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Tables G.1 and G.2 in the Appendix G provide summary statistics for Greece and Spain,
respectively. Table G.3 contains a short description of the variables used as well as their source.
Tables G.4 and G.5 report correlation coefficients between all of the study variables for Greece
and Spain, respectively.
3.2

Estimation approach
We model zoning corruption (𝑌𝑖𝑡 ) as a function of housing prices (𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) and adjust for

educational attainment, unemployment, population, population density, and number of new
building permits 𝑿𝑖𝑡 issued in region 𝑖 at time 𝑡. We also use housing price lags to account for
the inherently slowly process of construction. Time-invariant, region-specific variation is
captured by the regional dummy variables 𝛼𝑖 .
Because the count of zoning corruption includes many zero values, our modeling strategy
needs to take this into account. The coexistence of a high proportion of zeros along with large
values of counts makes it difficult for a linear specification to appropriately model corruption.
Assumptions such as normally distributed residuals and constant variance required for
identification in an ordinary least squares regression model rarely fit count data. The Poisson and
the negative binomial are the primary specifications used in the literature under these conditions
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
A Poisson data generating process assumes the rate parameter 𝛼𝑖 exp(𝑿′𝒊𝒕 𝜷) is known
when, in fact, it is a random variable itself. Further, Poisson models require that the conditional
mean is equal to the conditional variance. In our case, the latter exceed the former for both
Greece and Spain. In the presence of overdispersion (𝜆𝑖 ), negative binomial models are preferred
to Poisson ones due to their flexibility in modeling the moments of the observed distribution of
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corruption. Namely, negative binomial models permit the conditional mean to differ from the
conditional variance. The superiority of the negative binomial to the Poisson models in fitting
identified corruption in Greece and Spain can be seen, respectively, in Figures 16 and 17 below.

Figure 16: Poisson and Negative Binomial Fits of Zoning Corruption, Greece

Figure 17: Poisson and Negative Binomial Fits of Zoning Corruption, Spain
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Likelihood-ratio tests formally confirm the validity of our choice of negative binomial as
opposed to Poisson models, too.
Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) use the Andersen’s conditional log likelihood to
estimate fixed-effects negative binomial models. Allison and Waterman (2002) suggest that
Hausman et al. (1984) did not formulate a true fixed effects model in the mean of the random
(dependent) variable because they did not control for all time invariant covariates. Their model
layers the fixed effect into the heterogeneity portion of the model and not the conditional mean.
This portion is then conditioned out of the distribution to produce the model Hausman et al.
(1984) estimate. However, the parameters that are conditioned out of the likelihood function do
not correspond to different intercepts in the log-linear decomposition of the overdispersion
parameter. Allison and Waterman (2002) propose an unconditional negative binomial model that
uses dummy variables to represent fixed effects. We follow their approach and specify 13 and 17
regional dummy variables for Greece and Spain, respectively. The probability mass function of a
single count 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , its mean 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) and variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) is obtained from
𝜆𝑖
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝛤(𝜆𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡 )
𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝜆𝑖
𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡 |𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝜆𝑖 ) =
(
) (
)
(1)
𝛤(𝜆𝑖 )𝛤(1 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖
𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖

𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (1 +

(2)
𝜇𝑖𝑡
)
𝜆𝑖

(3)

where the mean 𝜇𝑖𝑡 fluctuates with time but the overdispersion parameter 𝜆𝑖 is time-invariant.
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By design, the dependent variable could be interpreted as a rate of zoning corruption;
zoning corruption cases per number of new building permits issued in a month in Greece or a
quarter in Spain.14 Therefore, our estimates should be adjusted for the amount of opportunity for
corruption events. To do so, we introduce an exposure variable which reflects the amount of
exposure over which the outcome events were observed for each region-time observation.
Construction permits are chosen because they captured the window of bribing opportunities to a
zoning official. In the polar case, if zero building permits were issued, no zoning corruption
could have been detected.
We, implicitly, assume that the likelihood of zoning corruption events did not change
over time. That is, the denominator of the zoning corruption rate did not affect the numerator
beyond opportunity. If, for example, it took auditors and prosecutors different times to clear a
zoning corruption case then arrival time of each zoning corruption event was not just a matter of
exposure. But, there is no reason to believe that this was the case. In Greece, we use corruption
events of only the same intensity, thus, clearing time of each prosecution should have been the
same. For Spain the assumption would be violated if reporting of each case differed by the time
it took to be either judicially processed or released in the news. We discard these possibilities
because of the uniformity of the judicial system in Spain and the fact that the arrival time of
zoning corruption scandals to all media outlets is concurrent by briefs from the Associated Press
in Spain. Indeed, media coverage of zoning corruption across regions of Spain is not a concern as
97 percent of the zoning corruption scandals locally reported also appeared in national media.

14

To transform the dependent variable from a rate back to a count one can multiply both sides of the estimated equation by the
exposure variable. Logging yields a right side of the equation that includes the natural logarithm of the exposure variable. This is
called the offset variable and is required to have a coefficient of 1. Moving the offset variable back to the left side of the equation
turns the count back into a rate.
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Our baseline specification is the unconditional negative binomial dummy variable model
below:
ln(𝜇𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛽1 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝑰(𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ) + 𝛽3 ln(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) (4)
where 𝛽3 = 1. It is also referred to as the NB2 model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).
4.

Results
Recall that the Poisson model is a special case of the negative binomial one – it restricts

the over-dispersion parameter 𝜆𝑖 to be equal to zero. To test whether 𝜆𝑖 = 0, we perform a
likelihood-ratio test. Standard errors are clustered by region to allow for intra-regional
correlation.
4.1

The Case of Greece
The likelihood-ratio test of 𝜆𝑖 = 0 has an associated 𝜒 2 value of 132.93 which suggests

the probability that these observations were generated under the assumption that 𝜆𝑖 = 0 is zero.
This finding favors the use of negative binomial models in expense of the Poisson ones.
Parameter estimates are therefore based on negative binomial regression models. The
coefficient of interest is 𝛽1 and shows the impact of the housing prices during the bubble on
zoning corruption. Given the model’s non-linearity, its interpretation is not straightforward.
Therefore, the focus in Table 1 is only on the signs of the coefficients. Table 2 presents marginal
effects that allow for a more natural interpretation of the coefficients’ magnitudes.
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Table 1: Negative Binomial Regression Model – Greece, 2003-2008

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 above present the results of specifications using
contemporaneous and lagged housing prices, respectively. Column (2) suggests that for a one
euro per square meter increase in monthly housing prices, the difference in the logs of expected
counts of zoning corruption is expected to increase by 0.00194 unit, while holding the other
controls constant. This relationship is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
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Unemployment is positively but not significantly correlated with zoning corruption. More
densely populated regions have significantly lower zoning corruption. This is in line with the
practice of the audit process in Greece which is initiated and augmented by adjacent property
owners’ reports. This result highlights the importance of an active –or at least self-interestedcitizenry. The findings on the effects of educational attainment and level of population on zoning
corruption are mixed. Regional dummies are estimated in reference to Attica, the region of
Athens which is the omitted region. This is the most populous region of Greece by far;
approximately half of the country’s population resides in Attica. This is reflected on zoning
corruption counts as well, with the majority of corruption incidences occurring there. As a result,
all other region dummies compare negatively to Attica. We interpret this as a sheer size effect.
A tabular representation of the housing prices marginal effects is given in Table 7 below.
Table 2: Housing Price Marginal Effects – Greece, 2003-2008
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Variation comes in increments of €250 per square meter, starting from €1500 up to €3000
per square meter. We base our results on the lagged housing price specification. Column (2)
indicates a wide range of effects. The average predicted monthly corruption count is 0.193 when
18-month lagged housing prices equaled €1500 per square meter and the other controls are at
their mean values. We estimate as many as 1.3 more cases of zoning corruption per month when
housing prices double to €3000 per square meter. This increasing relationship to housing prices
is as expected; zoning corruption increased when profit opportunities became larger. This can
also be seen in the graphical representation of the 18-month lagged housing price marginal
effects in Figure 18 below.

Figure 18: Lagged Housing Price Marginal Effects, Greece

73

The graph covers a range of housing price values starting from €1250 through €2750 per
square meter in increments of €100 per square meter. It is evident from Figure 8 that as housing
prices increased, zoning corruption was intensified, as conjectured.
4.2

The Case of Spain
First, we discuss the results from the likelihood-ratio test of 𝜆𝑖 = 0. The 𝜒 2 value of

46.09 suggests that the probability that these observations were generated conditional on 𝜆𝑖 = 0
is zero. This implies that the negative binomial model is also far more appropriate than the
Poisson model in modeling zoning corruption in Spain.
Table 3 presents parameter estimates of negative binomial regression models for Spain.
Again, the focus should be primarily on the signs of the coefficients. Table 4 presents marginal
effects that allow us to interpret the magnitudes of the coefficients directly.
Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression Model – Spain, 2006-2008
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Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present the results of specifications using
contemporaneous and lagged housing prices, respectively. As for Greece, for Spain we base our
findings on the lagged housing prices due to the time-consuming zoning corruption generating
process. For a one euro increase in quarterly housing prices, the difference in the logs of
expected counts of zoning corruption is expected to increase by 0.00382 units. This relationship
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Population density is negatively associated with zoning corruption in Spain. This finding
again underscores the importance of civic engagement in curbing zoning corruption. More
civilian surveillance can substantially narrow the window of opportunity for zoning corruption.
The estimates of the regional dummies are obtained in reference to Andalucia, which is
the most populous and also one of the regions with the highest incidence of zoning corruption
scandals in Spain. However, when we adjust for housing prices and other control variables,
Andalucia becomes the median region in terms of zoning corruption levels.
Table 4 below presents marginal effects of housing prices on zoning corruption in Spain.
Table 4: Housing Price Marginal Effects – Spain, 2006-2008
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To capture the mass of observations, we consider values from €750 to €1650 per square
meter. The marginal effects of housing prices on zoning corruption are estimated in increments
of €150 per square meter. We base our results on the lagged housing price specification. Again,
the marginal effects exhibit a large degree of variation. The average predicted quarterly
corruption count is merely 0.038 when lagged housing prices stood at €750 per square meter but
grows exponentially at each housing price increment. The significance of housing prices as a
predictor of zoning corruption declines at higher values. This is a consequence of low power at
the highest housing price levels. For instance, only four regions ever recorded housing prices
greater than €2000 per square meter (Madrid, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, and the Basque
Country). But even so and similarly to Greece, zoning corruption in Spain was amplified when
profit opportunities were heightened. This is also evident in the graphical representation of the
housing price marginal effects in Figure 19 below.

Figure 19: Negative Binomial Regression Housing Price Marginal Effects, Spain
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We take a closer look at housing prices and consider values from €750 per square meter
to €1650 per square meter in increments of €150 per square meter. We choose this range of
housing prices because they are the most frequently documented.
5.

Sensitivity Analysis
A potential limitation of the analysis is the implementation of inference from a non-

random sample. Given the observational nature of our study, selection bias could be present if,
for example, zoning corruption is more likely in some regions than others due to unobservable
factors. Such constraints that mask the presence of underlying heterogeneity could lead us to
erroneous estimates.
The first potential source of bias could come from the presence of omitted variables.
Housing prices may have increased faster in regions with higher demand for housing coming
from factors that our baseline analysis does not include. For example, coastal regions where
tourism is more prominent could have experienced relatively greater price swings possibly
because land there yields higher rents.15 One would expect zoning authorities in these regions to
be more susceptible to receiving bribes for unlawful residential construction. To test whether
tourism-intensive regions are affected differently by the housing bubbles, we augment the
negative binomial model relevant controls. In particular, in order to capture the influence of
tourism in the housing stock of a region we adjust our baseline estimates with the number of
nights spent at tourist accommodation establishments and the number of bed-places (total
number of beds available to tourists) in a region.

15

In addition, the majority of new residential properties in Greece and Spain were second homes that were typically erected in
coastal areas (summer housing). Also, the percentages of total dwellings occupied by its owner were in both countries among the
highest in the EMU. By 2007, the owner-occupancy rates in Greece and Spain were 79.6 percent (4th highest) and 86.3 percent
(highest), respectively, when the EMU-average was a mere 62.3 percent (ECB Structural Issues Report, 2009).
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The results of the augmented negative binomial regression model are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Augmented Negative Binomial Regression – Greece, 2003-2008; Spain, 2006-2008

The positive and statistically significant relationship between housing prices and zoning
corruption is robust to the inclusion of the tourism intensity controls. The variables ‘nights spent
at tourist accommodation establishments’ and the ‘number of bed-places in a region’ are not
significant predictors of zoning corruption.
The second robustness check tests whether the baseline modeling of zero values is misspecified. The zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model may be more appropriate when
modeling count data with a significant number of zeros. As mentioned above, our time series for
zoning corruption events in Greece and Spain contain many zero values. Lambert (1992) and
Greene (1994) suggest that excess zeros may be generated by a separate process from the count
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values and models them independently using a logit model for predicting excess zeros. Here we
use issued construction permits as the predictor of the number of zero zoning corruption cases in
a region. Intuitively, the window of opportunity to engage in corrupt acts should be greater when
more construction activity is present.
To formally test for model misspecification, we conduct the Vuong test to determine
whether a ZINB versus a negative binomial model should be specified (Vuong, 1989). In
essence, we check whether the presence of a zero was actually true or is simply due to
misspecification. This test statistic has a standard normal distribution with large positive values
favoring the ZINB model, large negative values favoring the negative binomial one, and with
values close to zero favoring neither model (Long, 1997). In the case of Greece, the Vuong test's
z-values when modeling contemporaneous and lagged housing prices are 0.67 and 5.85,
respectively. For the model of contemporaneous and lagged housing prices in Spain the test’s zvalue are equal to .25 and 0.23, respectively. As a result, we cannot discard the earlier results in
favor of the ZINB models but still provide results from the latter as a supplement.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 below present estimates of the ZINB models for Greece
and Spain, respectively. We only present results for our baseline specifications that use lagged
housing prices.
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Table 6: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression – Greece, 2003-2008; Spain, 2006-2008

The positive and statistically significant relationship between housing prices and zoning
corruption is robust to the specification of a zero-inflated model as well. The results of this
robustness check suggest that the baseline modeling of the zero-dominated corruption generating
process is adequate. With respect to housing prices, the ZINB model for Greece yields very
similar estimates to the baseline model whereas for Spain it indicates our baseline estimates are,
if anything, conservative.
In our third robustness check, we ponder a necessary assumption of our baseline model.
The foundation for the negative binomial model is the Poisson distribution. It comes from the
family of exponential distributions and exhibits a “memoryless property”. It depends on key
assumptions regarding independence, stationarity, and homogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi,
1998, pp.5-8). However, when modeling individual-level, sequential behavioral choices these
assumptions may be potentially violated. In our case, it is unlikely that zoning corruption events
took place independently of former levels of corruption. In general, corruption is not
"memoryless". Bribes are offered because of the prevailing culture of bribery-prone zoning
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activity (for example, regarded as the most corrupt branch of the Greek bureaucracy). Such
cultural stylized facts are certainly not formed overnight. If bribing a zoning official was a
phenomenon alien to Greek and Spanish societies, then the increase in profit opportunities might
not have prompted the corrupt behavioral responses we find. Also, Andvig and Moene (1990)
argue that “corruption may corrupt” since the profitability of corruption may be related to its
frequency. This would violate the independence assumption, a fundamental Poisson postulate,
and put into question our baseline estimates from the negative binomial model. This motivates
the robustness check involving linear OLS regression (Mroz, 2012). More specifically, to test
whether our results are robust to relaxing the “memoryless” property in the manner zoning
corruption events arise, we estimate linear regression models. We re-parameterize zoning
corruption to a continuous variable because count data fit linear models poorly. The dependent
variable now expresses zoning corruption per 100,000 individuals. The results are shown in
Table 7 below.
Table 7: Linear Regression – Greece, 2003-2008; Spain, 2006-2008
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Columns (1) and (2) present estimates from the lagged housing price specification for
Greece and Spain, respectively. Our baseline results are robust to the linear specification. We
report a positive and significant association between housing prices and zoning corruption.
Figures 20 and 21 use binned scatterplots (“binscatters”) to provide a graphical representation of
the OLS estimates for Greece and Spain, respectively.

Figure 20: Graphical Representation of OLS Estimates for Greece using a Binscatter

Figure 21: Graphical Representation of OLS Estimates for Spain using a Binscatter
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Graphically, it is clear that as housing prices increased, zoning corruption was amplified.
The “binscatters” also indicate that this relationship is more significant in the case of Spain, in a
statistical manner. Our baseline results are robust even when we assume away the “memoryless
property” in the incidence of zoning corruption.
In our fourth robustness check, we employ Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
estimators to explore the importance of “dynamic panel bias”. As previously mentioned, this is a
plausible assumption because zoning corruption may not be independent over time. If current
values are related to their own past realizations, lagged values of zoning corruption should be
used as explanatory variables. Then, OLS estimates are subject to “dynamic panel bias” because
lagged values of zoning corruption are endogenous to the fixed effect in the error term
(Roodman, 2006). However, if T is large, dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant, and the
OLS estimates are reliable. Also, GMM estimators permit independent variables that are not
strictly exogenous, meaning correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error.
We can test the robustness of our results under the assumption that housing prices are
endogenous to zoning corruption. Given the observational nature of our study, this allows us to
assess the causal interpretation of the housing price coefficient of our baseline results.
Since GMM estimators assume a linear functional relationship, we use zoning corruption
per 100,000 individuals, a continuous dependent variable. We take first differences to eliminate
unobserved region-specific fixed effects and use lagged instruments to correct for simultaneity in
the first-differenced equations (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This yields the difference GMM
estimator. However, if the dependent variable follows approximately a random walk, then this
estimator will perform poorly. Specifically, past levels of zoning corruption will not be
informant of future changes and, therefore, untransformed lags will be weak instruments for
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transformed variables (Roodman, 2006). To increase efficiency, we difference the instruments to
make them exogenous to the ﬁxed effects (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).
This system GMM estimator will be valid assuming that differences in any instrumenting
variables are uncorrelated with the ﬁxed effects. The system GMM estimator is superior to the
difference GMM in terms of root mean squared error. However, the latter is important primarily
for prediction, in which the negative binomial model does already an excellent job as Figure 16
and 17 indicate. Bun and Windmeijer (2010) show that the 2SLS biases can be greater than the
OLS biases in finite samples due to a weak instruments problem. Therefore, we employ both the
two-step difference GMM and the two-step system GMM estimators with robust standard errors
and small-sample adjustments (Windmeijer, 2000).
GMM estimators are designed for panels with few time periods (T) and a large number of
cross-sectional units (N). Generally, the instrument count should not exceed the number of
regions because as T increases the number of instrumenting variables tends to explode and the
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test becomes imprecise (Roodman, 2006). To conform with this
rule of thumb, we collapse the panel of Greece to annual frequency (7 time periods) and the
panel of Spain in semi-annual frequency (6 time periods) and do not make extensive use of lags
as instruments. Autocorrelation is not a concern in any of the specifications according to the
Arelland-Bond test for an AR(1) and AR(2) in the first differences of the lagged instruments.
Table 8 below shows the results of the two-step system GMM estimations for Greece and Spain,
collectively.
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Table 8: GMM Estimation of Dynamic Panel Model – Greece, 2003-2008, annual; Spain, 20062008, semi-annual

Column (1) shows the estimates of a specification for Greece where zoning corruption is
endogenous in time, housing prices are endogenous, and augmented by density and education as
IV-style instruments. The coefficient of housing prices in column (1) is positive but not
statistically significant. The rule of thumb is preserved and we do not overidentify using few
instruments. Still, the latter are not particularly strong as the Hansen test indicates. Column (2)
shows the estimates of a specification for Greece where zoning corruption is endogenous in time,
housing prices are not strictly exogenous, and only year dummies serve as additional
instruments. The coefficient of housing prices is positive and almost significant at the 10 percent
level. The estimates in column (2) are more reliable since the instruments are stronger and the
instrument count does not exceed the number of regions in Greece. When we introduce more
controls (e.g. population density or educational level) the relationship of interest does turn
significant. However, this comes at the expense of instrument power as the instrument count then
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exceeds the number of regions in Greece. We refrain from violating this minimal rule of thumb
of GMM estimation but note that the positive and significant relationship between zoning
corruption and housing prices virtually holds.
Column (3) presents the difference GMM estimates for Spain. We specify zoning
corruption to be endogenous in time, and housing prices as an endogenous regressor. We use
density and education as instruments from the baseline controls. Unemployment is considered
predetermined but not strictly exogenous because its inclusion in the instrument pool severely
reduces the instruments’ strength. The instrument count in this specification is well below the
number of regions and, as a result, this set of instruments is the strongest among all estimations.
Accounting for any dynamic panel bias, we retrieve a positive and statistically significant
relationship between housing prices and zoning corruption. Column (4) shows the estimates of
the system GMM estimator for Spain where zoning corruption is endogenous in time, housing
prices are treated as an endogenous regressor, and only population density is added as an
instrument. The coefficient of housing prices is positive and very significant. The instrument
count in this estimation is just equal to the number of regions and, as a result, density is not a
weak instrument16. The Arellano-Bond tests show that autocorrelation is only minor.
The GMM estimates suggest that our baseline results are fairly robust to dynamic panel
bias, even when the panels are collapsed to fewer time units. The first takeaway is that the
positive association between zoning corruption and housing prices is preserved. Second, even if
housing prices are assumed to be endogenous, results do not change substantially. The statistical
significance in the case of Greece dissipates when parameters are estimated using the annual

16

Note that we drop the constant from the system GMM estimation to achieve equal instrument counts to regions.
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panel. However, any dynamic panel bias should be negligible in the longer, monthly panel that
served as the basis for estimation of the negative binomial and earlier linear models. Thus, we
cannot interpret the insignificant coefficient as evidence against our baseline results for Greece.
The positive and statistically significant relationship between zoning corruption and housing
prices in Spain is robust to the GMM estimations. This is encouraging for the validity of our
baseline findings because the “small T, large N” panel for Spain might have leaked dynamic
panel bias in those estimates. Clearly, GMM estimators are more enlightening in the case of
Spain (T=12, N=17) whereas the fixed effects estimator is more fitting for the baseline panel of
Greece (T=72, N=13).17
Finally, we conduct two country-specific robustness checks that address potential
measurement error.
In the case of Greece, we explore whether our results are subject to measurement error of
the housing price information. Recall that the housing price observations are the result of our
interaction of national time series with local cross-sections of housing prices. Here, we consider
a sub-sample of Greek regions for which the official housing price information matches our
geographical disaggregation perfectly.18 Our baseline findings are robust. To preserve space,
estimates are not shown. Even in this restricted sample, the positive relationship between zoning
corruption and housing prices persists.

17

The unconditional negative binomial model is susceptible to a potential parameters problem which there is no way to explore.
When using the dummy variable approach, estimates of negative binomial models in short panels might be inconsistent due to the
incidental parameters problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, p.282). These perform well for sample size of at least 200
observations, a sample size requirement met only marginally in the panel for Spain. In light of potentially inconsistent baseline
estimates for Spain, the system GMM estimates for Spain become even more important.
18 These are the regions of Attica and Central Macedonia that account for more than 50 percent of the country’s population and
include the mass of corruption counts.

87

In the case of Spain, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of our findings across all methods
employed by introducing deeper geographical disaggregation. We employ information at the
provincial level (Eurostat NUTS-level 3), a more local level of governance relative to the
regional level (Eurostat NUTS-level 2). Specifically, the number of cross-sectional units almost
triples from 17 to 50. As a result, we are able to exploit substantially more cross-sectional
variation in the identification of model parameters. Moreover, this geographical disaggregation
makes the causal relationship between housing prices and zoning corruption more tenable. By
design, the use of smaller geographical units reduces the measurement error in the association of
an instance of zoning corruption with a particular housing price level. The natural mapping of
zoning corruption to housing becomes less crude by almost 300%.
Data limitations prevent us from carrying out a similar geographical robustness check for
Greece as zoning corruption information is available only at the regional level.
Table 9 below revisits our findings from count data models using provincial-level
information. Specifically, columns (1) and (2) present results for the negative binomial and zeroinflated model regressions for housing price in levels. Column (3) replicates our baseline
negative binomial model of lagged housing prices, whereas in column (4) we implement its zeroinflated variant. Note that the set of controls varied slightly relative to the regional analysis. The
Eurostat does not provide a wealth of provincial information (NUTS level 3) which severely
restricts our choice of control variables. As a result, we use GDP level per capita in the place of
education and unemployment rate to proxy the level of development in the province. We
maintain population density as a control variable and use population as the exposure variable.
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Table 9: Count Data Models – Spanish Provinces

The positive and statistically significant relationship between zoning corruption and
housing prices persists at the provincial panel. We do not report any substantial differences
between the negative binomial models and their zero-inflated counterparts. This is due to the fact
that the two specifications are not different at all as the Vuong test statistic indicates.
Specifically, with a value of 0.06 and 0 for the contemporaneous and lagged specifications, the
two models are virtually the same.
Next, using the provincial panel we estimate linear models where the dependent variable
takes the form of a rate: zoning corruption per 100,000 individuals. It should be noted that the
increased cross-sectional variation naturally leads to a substantial improvement in our estimates
obtained via panel methods. This is particularly true for the GMM models that are ideal for
“small T, large N” panels. Thus, the findings of the following fixed effects and dynamic panel
models in Table 10 are preferable to the ones for Spain in Table 8 and 9.
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Table 10: Linear Models – Spanish Provinces

Again, our results from the linear models are insensitive to the geographical
disaggregation of the zoning corruption and housing price information. We recover a positive
and statistically significant result between the two in columns (1), (2) and (4). Controlling for
unobservable characteristics that are unique to a province, we show that both contemporaneous
and lagged housing prices substantially increase zoning corruption. The dynamic panel methods
in columns (3) and (4) address serial correlation. The coefficient of housing prices becomes
insignificant for the difference GMM estimator that relies primarily on corruption lags. However,
when we improve GMM estimation by also exploiting controls as instruments we are able to
replicate the earlier system GMM results for Spain.
Overall, the robustness of our baseline results to the use of provincial information
indicates they are not subject to significant error in space in the measurement and attachment of
zoning corruption to local housing prices.
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6. Concluding remarks
The understanding of the determinants of corruption and its effects on the economy is a
fast-growing field of study in public and urban economics. We follow an emerging literature of
the empirical studies of corruption that exploits shocks to corruption incentives brought about by
nature or by policy. We use the adoption of the euro and its associated windfall of cheap
mortgage credit in Greece and Spain to examine the effect of housing price bubbles on zoning
corruption. The increased supply of loanable funds at cheaper rates helped expand economic
activity for a decade but also postponed important structural reforms. The latter had significant
side effects that became imminent years later.
The empirical analysis relies on objective measures of zoning corruption in Greece and
Spain, measured at the regional level. We estimate negative binomial models and test the
robustness of our findings using zero-inflated and linear regression models. We document a
positive and significant relationship between housing prices and zoning corruption. The positive
association is robust to a series of checks that include zero-inflated variants of the negative
binomial model, and linear models that address model misspecification, omitted variable and
dynamic panel bias.
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Essay 3: The Short- and Long-term Effects of State Medicaid Expansions on Mortality:
Evidence from a Synthetic Control Design
1.

Introduction
Does public provision of free or low-cost health insurance to the uninsured improve their

health outcomes? This is an important health policy question because expanding Medicaid is
currently the only active policy margin of the Affordable Care Act. Theoretically, Medicaid
eligibility is expected to reduce mortality by improving access to medical care which, in turn,
may lead to improved physical and mental health. However, very little evidence exists to date as
to whether this is the case for adults.
Finkelstein et al. (2013) find no evidence of an effect of a randomized Medicaid
expansion in Oregon on adult mortality, but given the relatively small number of deaths in their
sample they may have lacked sufficient statistical power to detect reasonably sized effects.
Sommers et al. (2012) conduct a difference-in-difference analysis comparing three states that
expanded Medicaid in the 2000s to three adjacent control states, finding a significant reduction
of 6.1 per cent in adjusted all-cause mortality in the expansion states. However, Kaestner (2012)
questions the validity of this study's difference-in-differences design because pre-intervention
mortality trends in the treatment and control states exhibited statistically significant differences.
Sommers (2017) uses propensity-score matching to find that all-cause and healthcare-amenable
mortality at the county level declined by 6 and 6.7 per cent, respectively. As results are driven by
New York, it is unclear to what extent mortality reductions can be causally attributed to
Medicaid, the divergence in HIV-related mortality to pre-expansion trends or other idiosyncratic
factors to mortality in New York. Furthermore, disaggregation to the county level artificially
inflates the sample size as the expansions were implemented at the state level, overstating levels
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of significance. Given the small number of clusters (7), the issue is not addressed by clustering
standard errors by state and other techniques that introduce randomization inference are
preferable (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the long- and short-term effects of all major state
Medicaid expansions to adults in the 1990s and 2000s on all-cause, state-level adult mortality.
First, we implement a difference-in-differences (DID) design to estimate the effect of all state
Medicaid expansions on state-level, all-cause mortality. To identify the causal effect of state
Medicaid expansions on mortality, we employ a synthetic control design (SCD) that creates a
control group as a weighted average of non-expansion states that most closely resembles the preintervention mortality levels of expansion states (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010).
Finally, to shed light on what drives the observed heterogeneity in Medicaid’s efficacy in
reducing mortality levels across states, we assess to what extent the expansions of eligibility
increased actual coverage. Specifically, we examine how many more individuals enrolled in
Medicaid in each state following expansion. This allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the
reasons behind the underlying heterogeneity across states.
The contribution of this work is threefold. First, we contribute a novel study of the
dynamics of the effects of state Medicaid expansions to adults on all-cause adult mortality.
Second, our evaluation is comprehensive since it examines all state Medicaid expansions in the
1990s and 2000s regardless of scope of coverage. Each state-specific finding is complemented
with corresponding estimates of the size of each Medicaid expansion in terms of the levels of
total number of enrollees (total coverage). Finally, we provide a sensitivity analysis of the
inferential assumptions of pre-existing, quasi-experimental estimates for Arizona, New York,
and Maine.
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Our results suggest that pre-existing estimates of mortality reductions due to Medicaid
expansions are largely overstated. Mortality reductions due to Medicaid, if any, were more
pronounced in the long-run. We find that mortality reductions were possible only in states that
recorded substantial enlargement of their total Medicaid population and when comprehensive
insurance benefits are offered.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature discussing
the effectiveness of public health provision on curbing mortality. Section 3 discusses the data
and the methods employed. Section 4 presents the baseline results and, further, explores
heterogeneous effects of Medicaid across sub-groups of the treated population. Section 5
concludes.

2.

Literature on Public Health Care Coverage Effects on Health Outcomes
The experiment that could ideally be used to estimate this treatment effect would involve

a randomized control trial of a Medicaid expansion in a state, similar to the Oregon Medicaid
experiment (Finkelstein et al., 2013). But, by and large, the empirical findings are somewhat
mixed, possibly misguided, and outdated as increasingly more states have expanded Medicaid
eligibility for adults in the past decade at varying levels. Seminal work has found mortality
reductions following infant and children Medicaid expansions in the 1980s (Currie & Gruber,
1996a; Currie & Gruber, 1996b). However, others have found negligible effects (Epstein &
Newhouse, 1998; Howell, 2001; Levy & Meltzer, 2004).
Compared to the access and utilization literature, the study of Medicaid’s effect on health
is far less conclusive (Howell, 2001; Howell & Kenney, 2012). This is largely because health is
a difficult construct to capture and it is affected by a large number of factors that are typically not
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measured, but are correlated with enrollment in Medicaid, and there is a clear recursive
relationship between health and enrollment that can easily bias standard OLS regression
estimates (Levy & Meltzer, 2008). Nonetheless, a handful of researchers have attempted to
isolate Medicaid’s independent effect on health. Health in these studies has been operationalized
as birth weight, self-reported health status, disability, and mortality.
Lykens and Jargowsky (2002) find that Medicaid expansions during the late 80s and
early 90s appeared to decrease the number of acute health conditions and functional limitations
among low-income White children under the age of 15, but not among other racial groups. In
many studies, results for minority racial groups are hampered by small sample sizes. A priori it is
reasonable to expect greater gains by persons from minority racial groups due to the correlation
of poverty and race. Within the context of the Oregon experiment, Baicker et al. (2013) consider
a subset of health outcomes potentially affected by Medicaid coverage that are important
contributors to morbidity and mortality; namely, hypertension, high cholesterol levels, diabetes,
and depression. They report detectable improvement only in the case of depression (but not selfreported happiness); however, their investigation was underpowered by the relatively small
number of patients with these conditions. Black et al. (2017) compare the mortality hazard rates
of near-elderly individuals that received insurance (public or private) in 1992 to those uninsured
over a 20-year period. Based on waves of the Health and Retirement Study, they find that the
mortality hazard rates of the two groups are not substantially different. They interpret their
findings as evidence that “prior studies have greatly overestimated the health and mortality
benefits of health insurance for the uninsured”. Many other studies have examined the
connection between Medicaid and health, but due to weak study designs that fail to account for
unobserved confounding and selection bias, little confidence can be placed in their results.
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Hadley (2003) provides a summary the literature on the impact of health insurance on mortality
that compares an insured to an uninsured study population. The pattern that emerges from
existing studies that may suffer from methodological flaws is that Medicaid does indeed improve
health; however, the effect is often modest, but notably stronger among younger and more
disadvantaged populations.

3.

Empirical Analysis
This section first provides a brief discussion of the data we use. Then, we offer a

description of the two identification strategies we undertake. Finally, we proceed to specify the
empirical models we estimate our coarsened exact matching procedure in detail.
3.1

Data
Mortality data are obtained from the Compressed Mortality File of the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and are available from 1986 to 2010. Socio-economic
characteristics are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics whereas demographic
information comes from the Census. We employ state-level information such as average
unemployment rate, median income, population, per cent of the population in poverty, married,
male, 25-years-of-age and above with a Bachelor’s degree, in 20-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 age
groups, white, Hispanic or other race. Information on the total number of Medicaid beneficiaries
is coming from the University of Kentucky’s Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR) National
Welfare Data that combines resources from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the
Medicaid Budget and Expenditure System (MBES) and Quarterly Medicaid Enrollment and
Expenditure Reports. It should be noted that this figure includes all Medicaid eligible sub-
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populations such as children, not just adults, in June. We net out the (rounded 12-month fiscal
year average) number of participants in each state’s Women, Infants and Children (WIC)
program to approximate the number of adult Medicaid beneficiaries, even though that still does
not exclude teenage children.
3.2

Identification

Difference-in-Differences Design
We begin with a simple but likely naïve difference-in-differences design (DID). For
control states, we first use all non-expanding states and then choose region-specific ones. This
shows the effect of Medicaid on mortality in all states that expanded over the span of two
decades relative to the national and regional averages in non-expanding states. Implicitly, this
approach uses a linear combination of the untreated units with coefficients that sum to one. In
other words, the regression estimator could also be considered as a weighting estimator with
weights that sum up to one. However, there is no restriction on the values these weights may
take, enabling extrapolation outside the support of the data (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller,
2014).
The identifying assumption for a causal interpretation of the parameter of interest in the
DID design is that, conditional on the other covariates, changes in the mortality pre-intervention
would have been the same in expansion and non-expansion states in the absence of the
intervention. The validity of the DID is confirmed in Figures I.1 through I.3 in Appendix I that
clearly show that the assumption of common trends does hold.
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Synthetic Control Design
Next, we turn to the SCD, a data-driven procedure introduced by Abadie et al. (2010). In
this case, controls are weighted averages of states that did not expand Medicaid that most closely
resemble pre-intervention mortality predictor values in states that did expand. The intuition
behind the approach is that a combination of units often provides a better comparison for the unit
exposed to the intervention than any single unit alone. This offers reasonable counterfactuals of
mortality rates in treated states if the expansion had not occurred. The procedure reweights the
control group such that the synthetic control expanding states match observable characteristics
and pre-intervention mortality values. Unlike the regression approach, the SCD estimator assigns
weights ranging between zero and one to shield off extrapolation bias. This prevents estimation
of “extreme counterfactuals” by forcing to show the proximity between treated and control.
For identification, a SCD makes two implicit assumptions. First, there exists no
interference between units that comprise the donor pool (Rosenbaum, 2007). Given the statespecific nature of the expansion and our state-year panel, this holds by design. More importantly,
unbiasedness requires that there exists a synthetic control with a vector of weights
∗
∗
𝑾∗ = {𝑤2∗ , … , 𝑤𝐽+1
|𝑤𝑗∗ ≥ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽 + 1 , 𝑤2∗ + ⋯ 𝑤𝐽+1
= 1} (1)

a vector 𝒁𝑖 of observed covariates (unaffected by the intervention), and a vector 𝝁𝑖 of unknown
factor loadings such that
𝐽+1

𝐽+1

∑ 𝑤𝑗∗ 𝒁𝑗 = 𝒁1 , ∑ 𝑤𝑗∗ 𝝁𝑗 = 𝝁1 (2)
𝑗=2

𝑗=2
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Even if equation (3) holds only approximately for a synthetic control that fits well but not
perfectly the treated state, the bias of the estimator will tend to zero as the number of preintervention treatment periods increases. In our sample, the post-intervention period commences
the first full year after the Medicaid expansions since we drop the transitional year of the
expansion.1 It extends for 11 years while the pre-intervention period is defined as the six years
leading up to the expansion. This is the maximum number of pre- and post-intervention years
that can be accommodated for each state. By using the same number of pre- and post-treatment
periods for each state, we can easily transition into the national-level estimation where we pool
all treated and all control units together.
Inference is based on placebo tests in time and space. The placebo test in space estimates
the probability of finding mortality reductions of the magnitude of the observed reduction in
treated states under a random permutation of the expansion to generate the p-values of our
estimated effects. In addition, leave-one-out sensitivity checks show that our findings are robust
to the exclusion of any particular control state from the donor pool.
3.3

Estimation

Difference-in-Differences Implementation
We estimate the following specification in the DID design:
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑡 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 −
𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍 𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒍𝒕 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛺𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑠𝑡 (3)

1

In doing so, we lose information from the months before and after the Medicaid expansion pertaining to the
transitional years.
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where 𝑖 indexes age, 𝑗 race, 𝑘 gender, 𝑙 state, 𝑠 state-treatment-control pairing, and 𝑡 year.
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑡 indicates whether state 𝑠 expanded Medicaid in year 𝑡. 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 is a vector of
demographics (percentage of the population that is white, Hispanic, percentage of the population
that is female, and age indicators for groups 20-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64 years old).
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 − 𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍 𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒍𝒕 include state-year-specific poverty rate, median income (measured in
constant 2012 $), population size, unemployment rate, and percentage of the population with a
high school diploma and percentage of the population that is married. The
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether the dependent variable was
censored by the CDC for a death count between 1 and 5. Finally, we include year and state fixed
effects 𝜇𝑡 and 𝛺𝑙 , respectively. We adjust our estimates by state population weights. The
adjustment gives a greater weight to mortality rates from states with relatively larger populations.
However, panel data methods require that the weight remains constant across all years for a
particular state (panel unit). To this end, we rely on constant weights that reflect each state’s
population as measured by the 2001 Census.2 The parameter of interest is 𝛽1 that denotes the
effect of the state Medicaid expansion on adult mortality.
Synthetic Control Design Implementation
To implement the SCD numerically, we solve a nested optimization problem. First, we
minimize the multivariate distance between values of mortality predictors 𝑿𝒊𝒕 of states
expanding Medicaid to their corresponding synthetic controls subject to weight constraints 𝑾
ranging [0,1]. Then, we introduce matrix 𝑽 that applies different weights to 𝑿𝒊𝒕 depending on the

2

Alternatively, we assume that each state-year combination is a separate observation and cluster standard errors at
the state level, so that states may have a larger weight in 2007 than in 1992. Estimating via indicator variables for
state and years, gives rise to only very minor increases in the standard errors that does not change statistical
significance of the point estimates.
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covariate’s predictive power of mortality. Our choice of 𝑽 which is the solution to the inner
minimization problem assigns weights that minimize the mean square error of the synthetic
control estimator.
Based on weights calculated by the SCD, our main results come from estimation of the
factor model in equation (4) below:
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑡 + ∑0𝑔=−𝑗 𝜇𝑔 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝑔 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑡 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4)
where 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 6 (but in our preferred specification 𝑗 = 1), 𝑖 indexes state and 𝑡 year. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 now
contains a set of observed state-year demographic and socio-economic information; namely,
percentage of the population that is female, aged 20 to 34, aged 35 to 44, aged 45 to 54 and aged
55 to 64, black, Hispanic or white, under the Federal poverty line, unemployed, aged over 25
with a high-school diploma, that is married and finally the level of median income (measured in
constant 2012 $). The term 𝜆𝑡 𝜇𝑖 captures heterogeneous responses to multiple observed factors.
The parameter 𝛿𝑡 is an unobserved, common, time-dependent factor. Finally,
∑0𝑔=−𝑗 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝑔 is a collection of lagged dependent variables over the pre-expansion
years that start from the previous full calendar year preceding a Medicaid expansion
(𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) up to the earliest pre-treatment period year (𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−6 ). The
model selection is data-driven so that the final specification is resulting into the lowest Mean
Squared Prediction Error (MSPE).. Following Kaul et. al (2016), our baseline specification
includes only the last value of the pre-treatment outcome lags in addition to the demographic and
socio-economic controls above.3 We also experiment with a specification that includes either
only pre-treatment outcome lags or the average across all pre-treatment outcome lags and
3

Kaul et. al (2016) show that including all pre-treatment year lags as predictors does result optimal pre-treatment fit
but also renders all other covariates irrelevant that may lead to substantial bias.
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controls. Our point estimate of interest is defined as the average difference between the statelevel adult mortality in a state with a Medicaid expansion during the years after it took effect to
its synthetic control representation and measured in levels; i.e., difference in the level of the
mortality rate per 100,000 adults.
Finally, we estimate an equivalent factor model to the one specified in equation (4) where
we substitute the outcome variable to be the number of total Medicaid enrollees in a state 𝑖 in
year 𝑡:
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑡 + ∑0𝑔=−𝑗 𝜇𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡+𝑔 +
𝜷𝟏 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑡 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5)
The notation denotes the same terms as in equation (4). Similarly, the final model is a
combination of the pre-treatment log-level of total Medicaid enrollees in a state preceding its
Medicaid expansion (𝑔 = −1) and the demographic and socio-economic controls. Given the loglevels specification, the point estimate of interest is now interpreted in per cent terms; i.e., per
cent change in mortality rate per 100,000 adults
4.

Results

Difference-in-Differences Estimates
For a graphical representation of the state-specific DID results, refer to Figures I.4.A
through I.14.A in Appendix I. Table 11 presents population-weighted estimates of the effect of
state Medicaid expansions on the average US mortality per 100,000 individuals. Due to the large
number of adopting states and their geographical dispersion this is an interesting finding from a
policy perspective. It represents a nationwide estimate of the projected impact of expanding
Medicaid on all-cause mortality, overall.
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Table 11: Aggregate DID Estimates of Effect of State Medicaid Expansions on Mortality
(1)
(2)
(3)
Full Sample
Contiguous U.S.
Hand-matched Sample
VARIABLES
Medicaid Expansion
% Female
% Hispanic
% White
% Aged 20-34
% Aged 35-44
% Aged 45-54
% Aged 55-64
Unemployment
Poverty
Log Average Income
% Married
% H-S Diploma
Log State Population
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of state

-22.532**
(9.432)
-18.891**
(8.182)
-5.149***
(0.942)
2.303
(2.395)
-4.531*
(2.646)
-11.278***
(3.447)
1.715
(5.649)
11.854***
(3.257)
0.888
(0.733)
0.193
(0.478)
44.325**
(18.979)
0.565*
(0.330)
-13.667***
(1.936)
96.343**
(45.311)
-422.414
(1,168.047)

-23.078**
(9.457)
-19.569**
(9.441)
-5.037***
(1.056)
2.362
(2.447)
-4.479
(2.672)
-10.983***
(3.561)
1.411
(5.622)
12.635***
(3.362)
0.811
(0.731)
0.236
(0.477)
45.809**
(19.405)
0.524
(0.342)
-13.606***
(1.936)
93.294**
(45.417)
-372.766
(1,214.235)

-22.071**
(8.543)
-22.401*
(11.219)
-4.789***
(1.135)
5.147*
(2.871)
-5.001
(2.973)
-9.630**
(4.127)
3.045
(6.360)
14.231***
(4.051)
1.214
(0.970)
-0.636
(0.545)
30.293
(19.261)
0.378
(0.326)
-14.155***
(2.885)
95.395**
(43.514)
-345.099
(1,371.818)

1,200
0.777
50

1,176
0.782
49

840
0.829
35

Notes: Estimates in column (1) are based on the DID design using the full donor pool of 39 control states; namely,
excluding Massachusetts. In column (2) we further discard Hawaii and focus on Medicaid expansions in states in the
contiguous US. Column (3) provides results from a hand-matched donor pool of neighboring/regional controls.
Time and state fixed effects included in all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Using the sample of the entire US excluding Massachusetts, we find that Medicaid had a
statistically significant and negative effect on average, all-cause, US mortality rates. Excluding
Hawaii or using hand-matched control states based on geographical proximity to the expanding
state, does not have a substantial impact on the magnitude of our point estimates or our standard
errors. The previously documented negative and significant relationship between Medicaid
expansion and mortality is very robust to a different set of samples.
Next, we narrow-in on each state that expanded Medicaid. Table 12 presents populationweighted estimates of the effect of the Medicaid expansion on all-cause mortality, on a state-bystate basis.
Table 12: State-Specific DID Estimates of Effect of State Medicaid Expansions on Mortality
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
AZ
HI
ME
Medicaid Expansion
6.890
9.628
8.241*
(3.775)
(25.409)
(3.122)
Observations
56
42
56
R-squared
0.9629
0.9866
0.8844
# Control States
4
3
4

Medicaid Expansion
Observations
R-squared
# Control States

Medicaid Expansion
Observations
R-squared
# Control States

(4)
MN
0.213
(3.422)
70
0.9313
5

(5)
NM
-0.755
(7.833)
56
0.9595
4

(6)
NY
-18.6188***
(2.522)
70
0.9385
5

(7)
OR
-11.943
(4.968)
42
0.9982
3

(8)
TN
1.913
(1.754)
140
0.9189
10

(9)
UT
9.101***
(1.239)
70
0.8281
5

(10)

(11)
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Medicaid Expansion
Observations
R-squared
# Control States

VT
-21.640**
(6.372)
56
0.8307
4

WA
-18.21257**
(2.804)
42
0.9956
3

Notes: Estimates are based on the following hand-matched donor pool based on geographical proximity, AZ: CA,
NV, CO; OR & WA controls: CA, ID; MN controls: WI, IA, ND, SD; UT controls: NV, WY, ID, CO; NM controls:
TX, CO, OK; ME & VT controls: NH, RI, CT; NY: PA, NJ, CT, RI; TN: KY, AK, MO, IL, MS, AL, GA, NC, VA.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The state-specific estimates reveal that the large, negative, and statistically significant
findings from the US aggregate analysis above was primarily driven by New York and to a
certain extent by Washington. The state-specific analysis for New York confirms that the state
experienced large reductions in mortality following Medicaid expansion. But, due to the fact that
New York is so populous relative to other Medicaid-expanding states, it is assigned such a large
weight that its influence dominates any competing effects from other states. For instance,
mortality rate increases followed the Medicaid expansions in Maine and Utah. However, their
population sizes dwarf the ones of New York and Washington which, subsequently, depress their
influence on the estimated average treatment effect of Medicaid on U.S. overall average
mortality rate. Combined with the fact that the only other large and statistically significant
findings are mortality reductions in Vermont and Washington, it is not surprising that the effect
of Medicaid expansions on average U.S. mortality per 100,000 individuals is negative and
similar in magnitude to ones of these states. Oregon also experienced mortality reductions but
not at conventional levels of statistical significance. Finally, mortality rates were not affected by
Medicaid expansions in Hawaii, Minnesota, New Mexico and Tennessee.
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Synthetic Control Design Estimates
A graphical illustration of the SCD findings is given in Figures I.4.B through I.14.B in
Appendix I. Table 13 below presents the estimated average treatment of each Medicaid
expansion over time, state-by-state. Table J.2 in the Appendix illustrates the dynamic treatment
effect of each Medicaid expansion, year-by-year, over the span of seven post-treatment years.
Table 13: State-Specific SCD Estimates of Effect of State Medicaid Expansions on Mortality
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
AZ
HI
ME
Medicaid Expansion
3.009
10.632
5.611
# Chosen Donor Pool States

Medicaid Expansion
# Chosen Donor Pool States

Medicaid Expansion
# Chosen Donor Pool States

Medicaid Expansion
# Chosen Donor Pool States

4

3

4

(4)
MN
-19.877

(5)
NM
11.880**

(6)
NY
-19.065**

5

4

5

(7)
OR
14.401

(8)
TN
20.421

(9)
UT
-31.678

3

10

5

(10)
VT
-7.873*

(11)
WA
-4.704

4

3

Notes: Chosen donor pool states for (1)AZ: CA, NV, CO; (2)HI: AK, CO, ND (7)OR & (11)WA: CA, ID; (4)MN:
WI, IA, ND, SD; (9)UT: NV, WY, ID, CO; (5)NM: TX, CO, OK; (3)ME & (10)VT: NH, RI, CT; (6)NY: PA, NJ,
CT, RI; (8)TN:KY, AK, MO, IL, MS, AL, GA, NC, VA.
Pseudo p-values from permutation tests: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

No clear and consistent pattern across states emerges from Table 13. Mortality reductions
are concentrated to a handful of states. We recover a large and statistically significant negative
effect on state-level mortality in New York and Vermont. Mortality reductions were also
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achieved in Washington following Medicaid expansion. Interestingly, we show that Medicaid
may even be associated with an increase in state-level mortality in the case of New Mexico. A
potential explanation for this counter-intuitive result is either a confounding effect of the opioid
epidemic in New Mexico that was commencing or a direct influence of Medicaid’s access to
medical care and opioids. However, this is a conjecture that needs to be investigated more
thoroughly using more information. For instance, state levels of opioid usage could be included
as a regressor. Alternatively, we could obtain diagnosis-specific mortality data and exclude
mortality counts with opioid usage as the primary cause of death to assess the robustness of our
results to the influence of the opioid epidemic in New Mexico. An increase in mortality was also
recorded for Hawaii that might simply due to the poor fit of the synthetic control. Similarly, we
recover mortality reductions in Utah and Minnesota but discard those results because of the
failure of the SCD to construct reasonable synthetic representations of Utah and Minnesota, pretreatment. Specifically, the mortality gap between the observed state mortality levels and the
synthetic ones remains large and negative before and after the respective Medicaid expansion.
A graphical illustration of the SCD findings with respect to coverage and access to care is
given in Figures I.4.C through I.14.C in Appendix I. Table 14 presents the SCD estimates of the
effect of state Medicaid expansions on the total number of Medicaid beneficiaries in each state in
analogous fashion to Table 13.

Table 14: State-Specific SCD Estimates of Effect of State Medicaid Expansions on Total Medicaid Beneficiaries
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
AZ
HI
ME
Medicaid Expansion (in %)
43.948
-19.891
27.200

(4)
MN

(5)
NM
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(6)
NY

Medicaid Expansion (in %)

-12.319

3.184

11.056

Medicaid Expansion (in %)

(7)
OR
33.102

(8)
TN
47.400

(9)
UT
15.102

Medicaid Expansion (in %)

(10)
VT
30.731

(11)
WA
10.789

Our synthetic control design estimates of the effect of Medicaid expansions on the total
number of beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid do not indicate a monotonic relationship between
the size of each Medicaid expansion and its impact on adult mortality. As one would expect, the
significant reductions in adult mortality were recorded in the states of New York and Vermont
were associated with substantial increases in the per cent of total Medicaid beneficiaries by 11.1
per cent and 30.7 per cent, respectively. Similarly, the mortality increases in Hawaii occurred
over a period when fewer beneficiaries were enrolled in the state’s Medicaid plan. However,
states like Arizona, Oregon and Tennessee saw an even larger expansion in the number of total
Medicaid enrollees but adult mortality, if anything, increased. In the same fashion, the significant
increase in mortality in New Mexico did not coincide with a contraction in the number of total
Medicaid enrollees. Still, one should interpret these associations with caution due to
measurement error. Specifically, adult mortality could have been affected by changes in the
mortality levels of adult pregnant women which were covered by WIC. Also, the number of total
Medicaid enrollees might have changed due to increases of coverage to teenagers who do not
contribute to the average adult mortality levels.
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5.

Concluding Remarks
Using a synthetic control design with randomization inference, there is no evidence that

Medicaid expansions reduce adult mortality in most states. Our state-specific findings are robust
to the research design we employ. Specifically, the estimated state-specific treatment effects
using a SCD in Table 13 are more conservative relative to the DID ones in Table 12 above. The
estimated effect sizes are fairly comparable and the direction of the sign differs only for states for
which statistically insignificant results are found. Still, our DID findings suggest that, at the
national level, Medicaid did reduce mortality, a result primarily driven by the large influence of
populous New York on the national average.
Our results from suggest that pre-existing estimates of mortality reductions due to
Medicaid expansions are overstated. Our findings about New York are in line with Sommers et
al. (2012) and Sommers (2014). However, our results for the case of Arizona and Maine point
toward a null effect of Medicaid expansions on state-level adult mortality. Moreover, our
findings suggest that these interventions may even lead to an increase in mortality when other
behavioral factors are at play such as the opioid epidemic. It should be noted that the size of
these Medicaid expansions differed across state. However, no clear-cut relationship between the
size of the Medicaid expansions in terms of total number of Medicaid enrollees and adult
mortality can be deduced. It is possible that adult mortality is not driven by the extensive margin
of health coverage but the intensive one; i.e., the quality and generosity of each state’s Medicaid
plan.
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Appendix A: Solving the Model
From the taxpayer’s perspective, the critical action of tax administration is whether collection
of the tax liabilities will be enforced. It is important to clarify that tax evasion in this model
occurs either directly through taxpayer non-compliance (potentially due to beliefs of weak tax debt
collection enforcement) or indirectly through actual weak debt collection enforcement on behalf
of the tax administration.
The first-order condition with respect to the level of the tax delinquent debt to evade is:

∂ u(cni )
∂ u(cei )
∂ EU
=
(1
−
π
)
·
−
θ
·
π
·
=0
i
i
∂ xi1
∂ xi1
∂ xi1

(10)

where cei = yi − θ · xi − si is period-one consumption if debt collection is perfectly enforced

and cni = yi + xi − si if it is not enforced. At the optimal amount of non-compliance of the tax

delinquency, the expected utility from consumption augmented by income from the unenforced
collections of the outstanding tax debt is equal to the expected costs from reduced consumption
due to the enforced tax lien, (1 − πi ) ·

∂ u(cni )
∂ xi1

= θ · πi ·

∂ u(cei )
.
∂ xi1

The first-order condition with respect to the level of savings of the portion of the debt to be
evaded is:

∂ u(cni )
∂ u(cei )
∂ EU
∂V (s, π n )
∂V (s, π e )
= −(1 − πi ) · [
−δ
]
−
π
·
[
−
δ
]=0
i
∂ si
∂ si
∂ si
∂ si
∂ xi1

(11)

The taxpayer adjusts savings to equalize aggregate marginal utility of the two periods across
potential states of the tax debt collection enforcement.
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The first-order condition for k ∈ {e, n} state of the world of tax debt collection enforcement is :

kn
∂ u(cke
∂V
k ∂ u(ci )
k
i )
=
(1
−
π
)
·
−
π
·
θ
·
=0
∂ xi2
∂ xi2
∂ xi2

(12)

which implies a marginal rate of substitution across tax debt collection enforcement states of
the world:

MRSk =

∂ u(ckn
i )
∂ xi2
∂ u(cke
i )
∂ xi2

=θ·

(π k )
(1 − π k )

(13)

The optimality condition in period two resembles the one in period one only that it is conditional on first-period tax debt collection enforcement. At the optimal level of xi2 , marginal utility
derived from additional consumption due to income from unpaid tax debt whose collection is not
enforced is equal to the marginal cost from the enforcement of the tax lien and the application of
the financial penalty due to perfect tax debt collection enforcement. Consumption in the second
period then depends on whether the second-period debt collection is perfectly enforced conditional
2
on first-period tax debt collection enforcement; i.e., either cke
i = (1 + r)si − θ · xi under perfect or

2
ckn
i = (1 + r)si + xi under imperfect tax debt collection enforcement.

Comparative statics show that the effect on second period tax evasion of updating beliefs about
debt collection enforcement following taxpayer information gains in the first-period.

dxiB
=
dπ e

dMRSk
dπ e
dMRSk
dxiB

(14)
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The optimal amount of tax evasion is equal to

(y − s) ·

1 − π(1 + θ )
1 − π n (1 + θ )
1 − π e (1 + θ )
+ ρ · [(1 − π)
+π ·
] · (1 + r) · s
θ
θ
θ

(15)

From the government’s perspective, the present value of tax revenues is given by T below:

T (θ , α) =

Z

(1 − p)[1 − xi∗ ] · Rg + p · θ · xi∗ (Ri , qαi )dRi

(16)

The total present value of private welfare is given by:

PW (θ , α) = −

Z

{(1 − p)[1 − xi∗ (Ri , qαi )] · Ri + p · θ · xi∗ (Ri , qαi )}dRi

(17)

Clearly, the government is better off by not employing information nudging when it only values tax revenues, ψ = 1. When the government is is indifferent between private welfare and tax
revenues, ψ = 12 , then it is strictly better off by employing information nudging than relying solely
on the financial penalty. By the mean value theorem, there exists a unique ψ ∗ ∈ ( 12 , 1) for which
the government is better off employing information nudging (α < 1) if ψ < ψ ∗ , is indifferent between the financial penalty and information nudging if ψ = ψ ∗ and is better off relying solely on
the financial penalty (α = 1) if (q̂α > q) if ψ > ψ ∗ .
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Appendix B: Identification and Estimation
Coarsened Exact Matching
There exists a plethora of matching techniques in addition to the ideal but improbable exact
matching. The main distinction of matching techniques is their approach in measuring the distance
between observations of different treatment status. Propensity score matching and Mahalanobis
distance matching are characterized as Equal Percent Bias Reducing matching methods. CEM is
a generalized class of Monotonic Imbalance Bounding matching methods that dominates Equal
Percent Bias Reducing matching methods (Iacus et al., 2011). It provides post-matching samples
that are better balanced and estimates of the causal quantity of interest that have lower root mean
square error than matching based on propensity scores, Mahalanobis distance, nearest neighbors,
and optimal matching. These satisfy weaker properties and only in expectation.
Intuitively, CEM constructs a set of strata s ∈ S each with identical coarsened values for covariates. Then, the observations coming from strata that do not retain both a treated and a control
observation are removed. Let the treated and control observations in stratum s be T s ,Cs , respectively, whereas the number of matches is given by msT = T s , mCs = Cs . Then, the total number of
matched and controls over all strata is mT =

S

s∈S

msT and mC =

S

s∈S

mCs , respectively.

CEM makes an explicit statement about the overall covariate imbalance between treated respondents and untreated ones. Specifically, the statistic L1 expresses the global difference between
the multidimensional histogram of all pre-treatment covariates of T s and Cs . This measure includes imbalance with respect to the full joint distribution, including all interactions, of the covariates. Thus, L1 works for imbalance as R2 works for model fit: the absolute values mean less than
comparisons between matching solutions. A L1 = 0 statistic indicates perfect global balance up to
the level of coarsening. Larger values imply larger imbalance, with a maximum of L1 = 1, which
indicates complete separation. CEM assigns the following weights wi to matched and unmatched
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observations:

wi =





1,





if i ∈ T s
ms

mC
T
mT · mCs






0,

(18)

if i ∈ Cs
if i is unmatched

Regression Discontinuity Design
The choice of the bandwidth hn may reflect a trade-off between bias and variance or come
from cross-validation. It is widely preferred to use a data-driven bandwidth that asymptotically
minimizes Mean Squared Error, the sum of squared bias, and variance (Imbens and Kalyanaraman,
2009). In this treatment, a local linear estimator is used with a correction-term that prevents small
denominators in moderate-sized samples as mine. However, the preliminary bandwidths bn used
for the construction of the optimal one may not be optimally chosen. A second-generation plug-in
estimator proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) is based on bn ’s which are consistent estimators of the
corresponding population hn . This is achieved by using a fixed-matches, nearest-neighbor-based
"estimate" of the residuals as in Abadie and Imbens (2006). This makes confidence intervals more
robust to the bandwidth choice ("small" or "large"), as they are not only valid when the usual
bandwidth conditions are satisfied (being asymptotically equivalent to the conventional confidence
intervals), but offer correct coverage rates in large samples even when the conventional confidence
intervals do not. Lastly, quantile-specific bandwidths have been proposed that use cross-validation
as in Ludwig and Miller (2007). Within the hIK bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2009), observations are weighted according to the following formula that penalizes those further
away from the cut-off.

pwi = max{0,

hIK − |z|)
}
hIK

(19)
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The left panel of Figure B1 provides a residual plot of the outcome equation. The distance of
each point from the red line of zero indicates how poor the prediction is for that point. Clearly, the
residuals are highly heteroskedastic. They exhibit increasing variance as they take on increasingly
larger values along the x-axis. To obtain homoskedastic residuals, I transform Yi using the inverse
1

hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS), g(Yi ) = log[Yi +(Yi2 +1) 2 ] = sinh−1 (Yi ). This is a convenient
transformation for the outcome I am interested due to two appealing properties: (a) it is welldefined over zero but (b) retains logarithmic properties. Its first attribute prevents the empiricist
from discarding observations that take zero values, unlike the log transformation. This allows for
a logarithmic interpretation except for very small values of Yi (Burbidge et al., 1988).

Figure B1: Heteroskedastic and Homoskedastic Residuals
The right panel of Figure B1 shows the residual plot of transformed values of the outcome. The
cloud of residuals indicates that the residuals of observations with positive payments are normal.
Second, there is a downwards trending line of residuals that envelops the cloud from below and
tends increasingly farther for higher values of the outcome. These plotted residuals denote with
zero payments. It is worth noting that this downwards trending line is the main difference to the
residual plot of the log-transformed outcome variable. Thus, a logarithmic transformation will
also effectively address heteroskedasticity. However, by discarding observations with zero tax
payments and relying only on those with positive ones it will introduce sample selection bias.
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Appendix C: Figures
This subsection presents a graphical representation of the RDD findings for personal income
tax delinquents.

Figure C1: Universe of Tax Evasion Windows of Opportunity

Figure C2: First Stage - e500 Cutoff as an Instrument
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Figure C3: Effect of Reminder on Probability of Becoming Personal Income Tax Delinquent Again
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Appendix D: Tables
Table D1: Summary Statistics - New Tax Debtors
Variables

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

E-mail Reminder Recipients - N = 174,613
Total PIT Liabilities (in e)
Payment of Total PIT Liabilities (in e)
Payment of New PIT Liabilities (in e)
New PIT Liabilities (in e)
Age
Male
Salaried
Self-employed
Unemployed

292.44
99.11
292.44
99.06
53
0.73
0.80
0.19
0.15

448.11
277.52
448.11
277.45
17
0.44
0.39
0.39
0.35

50
0
50
0 9961.93
18
0
0
0
0

10000
9961.93
10000

1946.417
1171.45
1946.41
1171.30
16
0.41
0.42
0.42
0.38

146.6
0
146.6
0
18
0
0
0
0

10000
9770.91
10000
9770.91
99
1
1
1
1

Phone Call and E-mail Reminder Recipients - N = 2,762
Total PIT Liabilities (in e)
2235.446
Payment of Total PIT Liabilities (in e)
468.5465
New PIT Liabilities (in e)
2235.44
Payment of New PIT Liabilities (in e)
468.45
Age
55
Male
0.78
Salaried
0.76
Self-employed
0.23
Unemployed
0.18

111
1
1
1
1

Notes: Universe of "new tax debtors", taxpayers with newly-delinquent PIT ranging [e0,e10,000] with
and zero tax arrears. N = 177,375.
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Table D2: Summary Statistics - Old Tax Debtors
Variables
E-mail Reminder Recipients - N = 297,519
Total PIT Liabilities (in e)
Payment of Total PIT Liabilities (in e)
Payment of New PIT Liabilities (in e)
New PIT Liabilities (in e)
Age
Male
Salaried
Self-employed
Unemployed

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

1094.92
187.07
441.93
140.32
56
0.75
0.73
0.26
0.15

1217.76
445.33
536.51
311.05
17
0.43
0.44
0.44
0.36

51.71
0
50
0
18
0
0
0
0

9999.73
9972.47
9926.27
8771.91
111
1
1
1
1

2323.66
1842.48
1612.04
1533.34
13.74
0.37
0.48
0.48
0.31

252.22
0
77.61
0
20
0
0
0
0

10000
9565.65
9333.13
9167.54
90
1
1
1
1

Phone Call and E-mail Reminder Recipients - N = 1,550
Total PIT Liabilities (in e)
5246.85
Payment of Total PIT Liabilities (in e)
1239.91
New PIT Liabilities (in e)
2836.71
Payment of New PIT Liabilities (in e)
1040.31
Age
52.81
Male
0.83
Salaried
0.37
Self-employed
0.62
Unemployed
0.10

Notes: Universe of "old tax debtors", taxpayers with overdue PIT ranging [e0,e10,000] and positive
tax arrears. N = 299,069.
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Table D3: CEM-weighted Post-Matching Sample. Covariate Balance of Treated VAT Delinquents
with Combined (E-Mail and Phone Call) Compliance Reminders and with only an E-mail Compliance Reminder
Matched Controls

N = 241

Total Liability Range [400, 600]

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

Total Liabilities

543.64

30.04

500

599.97

Male

0.502

0.501

0

1

Age

42.8

8.1

23

67

Self-employed

1

0

1

1

Salaried

0

0

1

1

Formerly Self-employed

0

0

0

0

Debtor

0

0

0

0

Combined Compliance
Reminder Recipients

N = 70

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

Total Liabilities

543.73

29.51

503.69

599.49

Male

0.528

0.502

0

1

Age

44.9

8.9

23

66

Self-employed

1

0

1

1

Salaried

0

0

0

0

Formerly Self-employed

0

0

0

0

Debtor

0

0

0

0
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Table D4: CEM-weighted Post-Matching Sample. Covariate Balance of Treated PIT Delinquents
with Phone Call Compliance Reminders and Controls
Matched Controls

N = 545

Total Liability Range [600, 1000]

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

Total Liabilities

748.14

108.94

600

997.69

Male

0.776

0.417

0

1

Age

59.6

18.9

19

95

Self-employed

0.034

0.183

0

1

Salaried

0.965

0.183

0

1

Formerly Self-employed

0.058

0.235

0

1

Debtor

0.071

0.257

0

1

Combined Compliance
Reminder Recipients

N = 309

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

Total Liabilities

761.78

112.96

600

995.2

Male

0.663

0.473

0

1

Age

56.2

20.5

22

93

Self-employed

0.051

0.221

0

1

Salaried

0.948

0.221

0

1

Formerly Self-employed

0.055

0.228

0

1

Debtor

0.009

0.098

0

1
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Table D5: CEM-weighted Post-Matching Sample. Covariate Balance of Treated PIT Delinquents
with Phone Call Compliance Reminders and Controls
Matched Controls

N = 363

Total Liability Range [1000, 2000]

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

1349.04

281.34

1000

1995.81

Male

0.801

0.399

0

1

Age

0.077

0.267

0

1

Self-employed

0.034

0.183

0

1

Salaried

0.922

0.267

0

1

Formerly Self-employed

0.085

0.279

0

1

Debtor

0.187

0.390

0

1

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

1341.45

269.8

1000

1994.58

Male

0.718

0.45

0

1

Age

63.6

18

24

96

Self-employed

0.05

0.218442

0

1

Salaried

0.95

0.218

0

1

Formerly Self-employed

0.086

0.281

0

1

Debtor

0.04

0.198

0

1

Variable
Total Liabilities

Combined Compliance
Reminder Recipients
Variable
Total Liabilities

N = 220
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Table D6: CEM Estimates of Effect of Combined Compliance Reminder on Payments of PIT
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.22∗∗

1.85∗∗∗

1.20∗∗∗

0.85∗∗∗

0.11

(0.47)
3.239∗∗
(0.273)
0.019
0.9593

(0.31)
2.805∗∗∗
(0.187)
0.051
0.9499

(0.16)
2.42∗∗∗
(0.14)
0.05
0.8024

(0.17)
2.79∗∗∗
(0.18)
0.04
0.8076

(0.26)
3.58∗∗∗
(0.41)
0.01
0.8248

0.2137

0.4783

0.4956

0.5861

0.5899

Variables
Combined Compliance
Reminders
Constant
R-Squared
Pre-Matching Covariate
Imbalance L1
Post-Matching Covariate
Imbalance L1
Total Liability Range
# of Matched Strata
# of Matched Treated
Observations
# of Matched Control
Observations
Observations
∗∗∗

[400, 600] [600, 1000] [1000, 2000] [2000, 5000] [5000, 10000]
45
98
346
333
157
70
140
900
646
389
241

538

1441

955

332

311

678

2, 341

1, 601

721

p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the zip code level.
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Table D7: 2SLS Estimates of Compliance Reminders’ LATEs on Payments of Total PIT Liabilities
Variables
Phone Call
Distance to
Cutoff

(1)
Payments
in Levels

(2)
Payments
in Levels

(3)
Payments
in %

(4)
Payments
in %

(5)
Payment
Rate

(6)
Payment
Rate

−728.69
(658.25)
1.14

−1033.079
(916.50)
6.94

−40.80∗
(21.51)
0.16∗∗∗

−46.67∗∗
(21.58)
0.42

−9.17∗∗
(4.28)
0.08

−9.14∗
(4.87)
0.06

(1.10)

(4.35)
0.30

(0.07)

(0.28)
0.07

(0.06)

(0.22)
−0.02

Distance to
Cutoff Squared
Above Cutoff ∗
Distance to
Cutoff

−10.57
(1.59)

Above Cutoff ∗
Distance to
Cutoff Squared
Constant
Polynomial
Order
Bandwidth (in e)
Observations
∗∗∗

(0.24)
−1.11
(6.37)
−0.12

(9.54)
1

(0.50)
128.48∗∗∗
(8.07)
2

10.90
8, 376

132.60∗∗∗

−0.22
(0.14)

(0.07)
−0.12
(0.51)
−0.01

(0.17)
1

(0.09)
3.46∗∗∗
(0.22)
2

10.90

4.18

8, 376

3, 547

3.33∗∗∗

−0.03
(0.11)

(0.16)
−0.03
(0.40)
−0.04

(0.04)
1

(0.26)
0.59∗∗∗
(0.06)
2

4.18

3.01

3.01

3, 547

2, 606

2, 606

0.60∗∗∗

p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 2SLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the zip code level.
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Table D8: 2SLS Estimates of Compliance Reminders’ LATEs on Payments in
Per Cent Terms of Total PIT Liabilities by Debt Vintage
(1)
New Debtors

(2)
Old Debtors

Polynomial Order
Bandwidth (in e)
# Treated Observations

0.97
(4.39)
0.01
(0.04)
0.04
(0.06)
3.64∗∗∗
(0.24)
1
11.67
41

−28.05∗
(16.23)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
−0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
3.38∗∗∗
(0.03)
1
250
117

Observations

1, 415

121, 037

Variables
Compliance Reminder(s)
Distance to Cutoff
Above Cutoff-Distance
Constant

∗∗∗

p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the zip
code level.
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Table D9: 2SLS Estimates of Compliance Reminders’ LATEs on Payments of Total PIT
Liabilities
Variables
Old Debtor
Unemployed
Self-Employed
Distance to Cutoff
Distance to Cutoff Squared
Age
Age Squared
Male
Bandwidth (in e)
Observations
∗∗∗

(1)
Payment, Levels

(2)
Payment, %

(3)
Payment Rate

−49.62∗∗∗
(15.58)
2.34
(17.41)
10.69
(17.16)
0.87∗
(0.49)
−0.05
(0.04)
1.85
(2.13)
−0.01
(0.01)
18.32
(11.97)
10.90

−0.13
(0.24)
0.03
(0.30)
0.17
(0.31)
0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.02
(0.03)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.34
(0.22)
21.38

−0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
0.02
(0.04)
0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.04
(0.02)
35.12

703

1, 277

2, 106

p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the zip code level.

Table D10: Inspection of Baseline Covariate Balance at Optimal Bandwidth around Cut-offT-tests
Statistic

Mean

St.Dev.

Mean

St.Dev.

Relative to Cutoff

Below

Below

Above

Above

Male
Age
Old Debtor
Salaried
Self-employed
Unemployed
Observations

0.738
57.425
0.851
0.782
0.218
0.158
4,451

0.440
17.295
0.356
0.413
0.404
0.365
4,451

0.756
58.094
0.844
0.764
0.236
0.152
4,643

0.430
17.151
0.363
0.425
0.420
0.359
4,643

Pr(|T | >
|t|)
0.054∗
0.076∗
0.3869
0.047∗∗
0.049∗∗
0.4525

Notes: optimal bandwidth is [e489.1,e510.9]. Columns (1) and (2) contain the mean and standard
deviation of the baseline covariate for observations strictly below the e500 cut-off. Columns (3) and
(4) contain the mean and standard deviation of the baseline covariate for observations above the e500
cut-off. Column (5) shows the two-tailed p-value computed using the t distribution which represents
the probability of observing a greater absolute value of t under the null hypothesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01;
∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1
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Appendix E: Images

Figure E1: 2013 Compliance Reminder E-mail (translated from Greek by the author)
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Appendix F: Figures

(32,217]
(24,32]
(18,24]
[14,18]
Figure F.1: Aggregate Corruption Counts from 2003 to 2008 – Map of Regions of Greece and Number
of Zoning Corruption Counts

(695,4000]
(589,695]
(329,589]
[203,329]
Figure F.2: Average Regional Population from 2000 through 2008 – Map of Regions of Greece
and Number of Thousand Inhabitants
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(24,91]
(18,24]
(11,18]
[5,11]

Figure F.3: Aggregate Corruption Counts from 2006 through 2008 – Map of Regions of Spain and
Number of Zoning Corruption Counts

Figure F.4: Average Regional Population from 2000 through 2008 – Map of Regions of Spain and
Number of Thousand Inhabitants
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Appendix G: Tables
Table G.1: Summary Statistics – Greece, N = 936

Table G.2: Summary Statistics – Spain, N = 204
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Table G.3: Data Notes
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Table G.4: Correlation Coefficients – Greece, N = 936

Table G.5: Correlation Coefficients – Spain, N = 204
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Appendix I: Figures
Aggregate Analysis

Figure I.1: Mortality Rate Trends in Adopting and non-Adopting Medicaid States (Full Sample)
Notes: Medicaid expansions occurred in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2001, and 2002
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Figure I.2: Mortality Rate Trends in Adopting and non-Adopting Medicaid States (contiguous
U.S. sample excluding Hawaii)
Notes: Medicaid expansions occurred in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2001, and 2002
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Figure I.3: Mortality Rate Trends in Adopting and non-Adopting Medicaid States (contiguous
U.S. sample excluding Hawaii and hand-matched control states)
Notes: Medicaid expansions occurred in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2001, and 2002
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State-Specific Analysis
1992 Medicaid Expansion in Minnesota

Figure I.4.A: Mortality Rate Trends in Minnesota
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 1992 and is denoted by the red vertical line

Figure I.4.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and Minnesota
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Figure I.4.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Minnesota and Synthetic Control
1993 Medicaid Expansion in Hawaii

Figure I.5.A: Mortality Rate Trends in Hawaii
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 1993 and is denoted by the red vertical line
137

Figure I.5.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and Hawaii

Figure I.5.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Hawaii and Synthetic Control
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1993 Medicaid Expansion in Washington

Figure I.6.A: Mortality Rate Trends in Washington
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 1993 and is denoted by the red vertical line

Figure I.6.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and Washington
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Figure I.6.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Washington and Synthetic Control
1994 Medicaid Expansion in Oregon

Figure I.7.A: Mortality Rate Trends in Oregon
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 1994 and is denoted by the red vertical line

140

Figure I.7.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and Oregon

Figure I.7.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Oregon and Synthetic Control
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1994 Medicaid Expansion in Tennessee

Figure I.8.A: Mortality Rate Trends in Tennessee
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 1994 and is denoted by the red vertical line
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Figure I.8.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and Tennessee

Figure I.8.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Tennessee and Synthetic Control
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1995 Medicaid Expansion in Vermont

Figure I.9.A: Mortality Rate Trends in Vermont
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 1995 and is denoted by the red vertical line
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Figure I.9.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and Vermont
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Figure I.9.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Vermont and Synthetic Control
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2001 Medicaid Expansion in Arizona

Figure I.10.A: Mortality Rate Trends in Arizona
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 2001 and is denoted by the red vertical line
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Figure I.10.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and Arizona

Figure I.10.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Arizona and Synthetic Control
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2001 Medicaid Expansion in New York

Figure I.11.A: Mortality Rate Trends in New York
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 2001 and is denoted by the red vertical line
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Figure I.11.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and New York

Figure I.11.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Synthetic Control and New York
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2002 Medicaid Expansion in Maine

Figure I.12.A: Mortality Rate Trends in Maine
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 2002 and is denoted by the red vertical line
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Figure I.12.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and Maine

Figure I.12.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Maine and Synthetic Control:
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2002 Medicaid Expansion in New Mexico

Figure I.13.A: Mortality Rate Trends in New Mexico
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 2002 and is denoted by the red vertical line
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Figure I.13.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and New Mexico

Figure I.13.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in New Mexico and Synthetic
Control
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2002 Medicaid Expansion in Utah

Figure I.14.A: Mortality Rate Trends in Utah
Notes: Medicaid expansion occurred in 2002 and is denoted by the red vertical line
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Figure I.14.B: Gap in Mortality per 100,000 people between Synthetic Control and Utah
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Figure I.14.C: Total Number of Medicaid Enrollees Trends in Utah and Synthetic Control
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Appendix J: Tables
Table J.1: Summary Statistics
Medicaid Expanding States: AZ, HI, ME, MN, NM, NY, OR, TN, UT, VT, WA; N = 308
VARIABLES
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Mortality Rate
323.036
56.656
224.517
474.264
% female
0.506
0.006
0.488
0.522
% Hispanic
0.109
0.121
0.005
0.473
% white
0.836
0.195
0.240
0.989
% aged 20-34
0.218
0.024
0.168
0.281
% aged 35-44
0.147
0.015
0.115
0.173
% aged 45-54
0.126
0.022
0.074
0.166
% aged 55-64
0.096
0.020
0.060
0.153
% married
9.550
3.563
4
22.6
% high school diploma
24.884
4.675
13.835
36.834
Average income
53132.78
7322.88
35988
72335
Unemployment
5.630
1.681
2.4
11.1
Poverty
12.799
3.679
5.7
25.5
Medicaid Non-Expanding States: Rest of the US excluding Massachusetts; N = 1,120
VARIABLES
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Mortality Rate
369.3958
79.31537
258.5546
863.1047
% female
0.509
0.009
0.472
0.535
% Hispanic
0.069
0.075
0.004
0.383
% white
0.827
0.121
0.307
0.985
% aged 20-34
0.218
0.026
0.172
0.318
% aged 35-44
0.147
0.015
0.109
0.201
% aged 45-54
0.126
0.022
0.074
0.166
% aged 55-64
0.097
0.017
0.052
0.146
% married
9.783
11.252
4
114
% high school diploma
23.440
6.612
10.993
60.129
Average income
52,098.79
8,714.83
31,819
77.506
Unemployment
5.772
1.982
2.3
13.8
Poverty
12.918
3.810
2.9
27.2
Sources: CDC, Census, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Cancer Institute

Table J.2: Dynamic SCD Estimates of Medicaid’s Impact on Mortality
(1)
(2)
(3)
Post-treatment Year
AZ
HI
ME
1
9.01
-2.57
3.02
2
-0.47
15.61
1.35
3
2.22
18.43*
18.40
4
10.83
23.02
17.05
5
15.90
25.61*
1.16
158

6
7

1.11
-17.54

2.14
14.96

2.44
-4.14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

(4)
MN
-29.12
-24.82
-16.65
-12.72
-18.42
-20.65
-16.76

(5)
NM
11.88
13.44*
9.73*
22.86**
26.20**
33.10**
36.31**

(6)
NY
-22.48
-22.12**
-17.09*
-25.87**
-32.06**
-15.65
-17.60*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

(7)
OR
12.94
17.84*
5.14
23.75
17.59
12.03
14.96

(8)
TN
13.02
14.45
17.02
22.34
22.78
28.98
24.36

(9)
UT
-32.56
-24.34
-38.05
-24.87
-20.21
-41.51
-40.20

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

(10)
(11)
VT
WA
1.39
-6.76
-7.70
-1.80
22.25
0.37
-17.94
-5.19
-19.09
-8.47
-33.79**
-8.48
-26.18
-2.60
Notes: Donor pool states for AZ: CA, NV, CO; OR & WA controls: CA, ID; MN
controls: WI, IA, ND, SD; UT controls: NV, WY, ID, CO; NM controls: TX, CO, OK; ME &
VT controls: NH, RI, CT; NY: PA, NJ, CT, RI; TN: KY, AK, MO, IL, MS, AL, GA, NC, VA.
Pseudo p-values from permutation tests; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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